Page:A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings of Dr. Henry More.djvu/194

 152 which must necessarily consist of points, point perpetually following point in the whole dcscription; which how monstrous it is to be admitted, I have already intimated in the foregoing Discourse.

So likewise the Angle of Contact included betwixt the Periphery and a Perpendicular falling on the end of the Diameter of a Circle, Geometricians demonstrate by reason to be less then any acute Angle whatsoever, insomuch that a line cannot fill betwixt the Periphery and the Perpendicular: whence the Phansy cannot but imagine this Angle to be indivisible; which is a perfect contradiction, and against the definition of an Angle, which is not the coincidence but the inclination of two lines. Besides, a lesser Circle inscrib'd in a greater, so that it touches in one point, through which let there be drawn the common Diameter of them both, and then let fall a Perpendicular on that end of the Diameter where the Circles touch; it will be evident that one Angle of Contact is bigger then the other, when yet they are both indivisible, as was acknowledged by our Imagination before: So that one and the same Angle will be both divisible and indivisible, which is again a plain contradiction.

And as Imagination is puzzled in things we are sure of by reason, so is it also in things we are certain of by Sense; for who can imagine how it comes about that we see our image behinde the Looking-glass? for it is more easie to fancy that we should deprehend our faces either in the very surface of the glass, or else in the place where they are: For if the reflected rayes might serve the turn, then we should finde the distance of our image no greater then that of the glass; but if we be affected also by the direct rayes, methinks we should be led by them to the first place whence they came, and finde our faces in that reall situation they are.

7. But to instance in things that will come more near to our purpose. We see in some kindes of Matter almost an invincible union of parts, as in Steel, Adamant, and the like; what is it that holds them so fast together? If you'l say, some inward Substantial form; we have what we look'd for, a Substance distinct from the Matter. If you say it is the quality of Hardness in the Matter that makes it thus hard; that is no more then to say, it is so because it is so. If you say it is a more perfect rest of parts one by another then there is in other Matter; if that be true, it is yet a thing utterly unimaginable: as for example, That upon Matter exactly plain, more plain and solid then a Table of Marble, if a man laid a little Cube upon it of like plainness and solidity, that this Cube by mere immediate touching of the Table should have as firm union therewith as the parts of the Cube have one with another, is a thing that the Phansy of man cannot tell how to admit. For suppose at first you drew along this Cube on the Table, as it would easily goe, both surfaces being so exactly smooth, and that then you left drawing of it; that these two smooth bodies should presently stick so fast together that a Hammer and a Chiesill would scarce sever them, is a thing utterly unimaginable.

Wherefore the union betwixt the Parts of the Matter being so strong, and yet so unimaginable how it comes to pass to be so, why should we not admit as strong or stronger union betwixt a Spirit and a Body, though our Phansy suggest it will pass through, as well as it does that smooth bodies Rh