Page:A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings of Dr. Henry More.djvu/188

146 neither Innate nor Acquisititious or Transcriptitious; because it involves in it the Notion of a Spirit, which again consists of such particular Notions as are utterly unconceivable.

Thirdly, That Existence is no Term of Perfection, and therefore is not so inseparably involved in the Notion of a Being absolutely Perfect, or of God.

Fourthly, That though Necessary Existence be included in the Idea of God, yet our inferring from thence that he does exist, is but a Sophism; because a Being absolutely Evil, as well as absolutely Perfect, includes necessary Existence in the Idea thereof.

Fifthly, That if there be any necessary Existent, it is plain that it is Matter, which we unadvisedly call Space, which we cannot imagine but did ever and will ever necessarily exist.

Sixthly, That God did not put this Idea of himself into the Mind of Man, but the subtiler sort of Politicians, that have alwaies used Religion as a mere Engine of State.

Seventhly, That Fear and Hopes of Natural Conscience are nothing indeed but these Passions rais'd upon a belief of a God which men have had by Tradition or Education.

Lastly, That these Arguments whereby we prove the Incorporeity of the Soul of Man, will also conclude the Incorporeity of the Soul of a Beast; and that therefore they are Sophistical.

To these I shall answer in order with as little Pomp and Luxuriancy of words, and as much Plainness and Perspicuity, as I may, in so subtile and difficult a matter.





1. That the force of his Argument for the Existence of God from his Idea, does not lye in this, that there are Innate Ideas in the Mind of man. 2. That the force of arguing from the Idea of a thing, be it innate or not innate, is the same, proved by several instances. 3. The reason why he contends for Innate Ideas. 4. The seeming accuracy of a Triangle to outward sense no disproof but that the exact Idea thereof is from the Soul her self. 5. That it doth not follow that, if there be Innate Ideas, a Blind man may discourse of Colours. 6. That Brutes have not the Knowledge of any Logical or Mathematical Notions. 7. Why Zeno’s Asse goes in a right line to the bottle of Hay. 8. That those actions and motions in things that are according to Reason and Mathematicks, do not prove any Logical or Mathematical Notions in the things thus acting or moving.

HAT some have excepted against our Demonstration of the Existence of God from his Idea, in that they have conceived that it is founded upon this Principle, That there are Innate Ideas in the Soul of Man; I can impute the mistake not so much to Ignorance as Inadvertency. For no mans parts can be so weak, but that if he attend to what  Rh