Page:A Brief History of Modern Philosophy.djvu/90

Rh identical propositions by a finite, the latter by an infinite analysis. The relation is similar to that which obtains between rational and irrational numbers.

f. The whole of the Leibnizian philosophy is characterized by a harmonizing and conciliatory tendency. He is especially anxious to combine mechanism with teleology, but without compromising the integrity of either. Teleology is simply to be another way of construing mechanism. He says that “everything in nature can be explained by final causes (causæ finales) quite as well as by efficient causes (causæ efficientes).”

But he is not satisfied to stop with this purely philosophical theory, notwithstanding the fact that its empirical verification contained an abundance of problems. He was also anxious to effect a reconciliation between ecclesiastical theology and philosophy. He wrote the Theodicée in refutation of Bayle, just as he had written the Nouveaux Essais in refutation of Locke. Here he employs the distinction between “necessary” and “contingent” truths: nothing can contradict the former; but since “contingent” truths can never be reduced to a final analysis, such as the principle of sufficient reason requires, we are compelled to go beyond the series of actual causes (extra seriem) and postulate a first cause, which is self-caused. The universe, actually created by this first cause, was not the only one possible;—according to the principle of sufficient reason—it must have been given the preference only because it was the best possible. Before the creation of the world the various possibilities presented a conflict in the Divine mind. This world was given the preference because it offered the greatest harmony together with the greatest multiplicity. But even such a world cannot be entirely