Page:A Brief History of Modern Philosophy.djvu/81

78 means of subsistence and this is more readily obtained in organized society than otherwise. Spiritual, unlike material, goods, which only one or a few can possess, are not the occasion of strife; they are rather the common possession of everyone, and here the individual can assist others without sustaining any loss to himself. The courageous instinct of self-preservation (fortitudo), which constitutes virtue, appears therefore not only in the form of vital energy (animositas), i.e. as power to impress the influence of one’s personality, but also in generosity (generositas), i.e. power to lend spiritual and material assistance to others.—But the acme of spiritual freedom can nevertheless only be attained through a perfect understanding of ourselves, in our real identity with that which is most essential and highest in Being, because we conceive our own energy as a part of infinite energy and we are filled with an intellectual love for Deity brought about by the joy of knowledge (amor intellectualis dei). We then see ourselves sub specie æternitatis.

In his theory of the state, contained partly in the Tractatus theologico-politicus, partly in the unfinished Tractatus Politicus, Spinoza, like Hobbes, draws a sharp distinction between the state of nature and life within the state; but he likewise holds that it is the duty of the state to secure a greater degree of freedom and independence than would be possible in a state of nature. The individual does not surrender his liberty when he becomes a member of the state. The state is not supposed to reduce men to animals or machines, but to provide the conditions for the development of man’s spiritual and bodily functions. It would therefore contradict its office if it failed to maintain liberty of thought and speech and to guarantee complete religious liberty.