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Rh that we get ideas of material things. Each idea is really a limitation of the idea of God.

Joseph Glanvil (1636-1680), of England, had even prior to this defined the problem of causality in his Scepsis Scientifica (1665), a book which was influenced by the philosophy and the natural science of Descartes. The greater the difference between cause and effect the less do we understand their connection. Causality cannot as a matter of fact be conceived at all (causality itself is insensible). Our perception is invariably limited to the fact that two things succeed each other.

Glanvil and the Occasionalists are the antecedents of Hume. There are two additional thinkers who are strongly influenced by Descartes, who however, each in his own way, are radically opposed to him, and in fact challenge every attempt to solve ultimate problems with the aid of reason.

Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) is closely related to Descartes in his conception of scientific method, and he likewise accepts his concise distinction between mind and matter. He makes frequent reference to these ideas in his Pensées. But philosophy could not wholly satisfy him. His heart longed for a living God, finally even for a God of flesh and blood, despite the fact that faith in such a God was repulsive to the understanding. He required such a faith as this to subdue the fear which the thought of the eternity of the world had kindled within him. The ideas of Bruno and Böhme failed to give him peace. Knowledge is uncertain, and the learned are at variance. Reason refutes the dogmatic philosophers, nature the sceptical philosophers. As a matter of fact in the last analysis the sceptics are right; otherwise were revelation unnecessary. In reply to those who find it difficult to subordinate reason