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With the declining influence of the speculative philosophy and the growing demand for a scientific world theory following it again making itself felt, partly in positivism, partly in materialism, partly in the new idealism, it was but natural that the problem of knowledge—as was the case in the period of Hume and Kant—should again assume a position of prominence. It raised the inevitable question of the ability of the human intellect, from its inherent nature, to construct such a world-theory, and of the limitations to which it is subject. It was evident that the reaction against Kant, in both its positivistic and its romantic aspects, had overreached itself, and the study of Kant was again resumed for the purpose of orientation. As we have observed, there was a critical undercurrent constantly making itself felt during the first half of the century (cf. Fries and Beneke, as well as Herbart, Schleiermacher and Schopenhauer). This now becomes the dominant current for a time, supported by the revival of a thorough study of the master both philologically and historically.

In his Geschichte des Materialismus (1865) Friederich Albert Lange (1828-1875), who was professor of philosophy at Zürich and later at Marburg, opposes the 289