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 Rh its relation to other Reals, and since the only example of self-preservation of which we can have any knowledge is contained in our own sensations, he nevertheless likewise really makes use of the analogy with our psychical experiences in the same manner as the metaphysical idealists. Even the soul is Real. Ideas arise in the soul as forms of self-preservation in distinction from other Reals. And since, according to Herbart, the Real which supports psychical phenomena must be different from the Real which supports material phenomena, he attains a spiritualism which differs from the Cartesian by the fact that the interaction does not take place between dissimilar entities, but between similars. Hebart therefore partly bases his psychology on his metaphysics (Psychologie als Wissenschaft, neu gegründet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik und Mathematik, 1824-5). But he bases the necessity of assuming a psychical Real largely upon the fact that our ideas present a mutual interaction and combination. Sometimes they blend (by assimilation), i.e. when they are internally related; sometimes they combine into groups (aggregations), i.e. when they are heterogeneous (as colors and tones) but still occur coincidently; sometimes they inhibit or obscure each other, i. e. when they are homogeneous without however being able to blend. That which we call our ego is the controlling group of ideas, which is formed by assimilation and aggregation, and upon which the determination of what shall have psychological permanence depends; for only that can persist which can be blended with the controlling ideas (i.e. be apperceived).—Herbart here recalls the English associational psychology founded by Hume and Hartley.