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 maintains the inseparability of the beginning and the end (God and the world). It is impossible to construe either of these from the standpoint of the other. But dialectic insists, in opposition to the religious method of representation, on the symbolic character of all expressions which are supposed to describe God, the world, and their respective relationship. Thus, e.g. the term "person," when applied to God, is nothing more than a symbol.

b. Just as knowledge presupposes the unity of thought and being, so action likewise presupposes the unity of will and being. Action would be impossible if the will were absolutely foreign and isolated in the world. The former presupposition can no more be a fact of knowledge than the latter. We are thus led from dialectics to ethics (cf. a series of essays published in Complete Works, III, 2, and Philosophische Sittenlehre, published by Schweizer, 1835). According to Schleiermacher ethics is a theory of development in which reason and desire cultivate and govern nature. This development would be impossible if reason and will were not already present in nature. Nature is a kind of ethics of a lower order, a diminutive ethics. Will reveals itself by degrees---in the inorganic forms, in the life of plants and of animals, and finally in human life. There is no absolute beginning of ethical development. Here Schleiermacher in direct opposition to Kant and Fichte coördinates ethics with nature and history. But it is nevertheless only within the realm of humanity that he accepts an actual, real development.

Ethical capacity consists partly of organization, i.e. of constructive and formative power, partly symbolizing, i.e. expressive and descriptive power. Its organizing activity is shown in material culture and in commercial and legal business. In its symbolizing activity man