Page:A Brief History of Modern Philosophy.djvu/178

Rh b. The empirical ego is dependent even as limited. It experiences an impulse to transcend the objects in order to transform them into means of pleasure. Activity reveals itself at first as mere natural impulse. But the impulse to act for action’s sake can never be satisfied by a finite object, and hence consciousness will forever strive to transcend what is merely given. Man gradually learns to regard things merely as means towards his own self-development. It follows therefore that the highest moral obligation is expressed in the law: realize the pure ego! And this realization comes to pass by virtue of the fact that each particular act belongs to a series which leads to perfect spiritual liberty. (Sittenlehre, 1798.)

Radical evil consists of the indolence which holds fast to existing conditions and resists progress. And moreover it leads to cowardice and treachery. The first impulse in the development towards liberty comes from men in whom natural impulse and liberty are in equilibrium, and who are consequently regarded as types. The spontaneous respect and admiration accorded to such typical characters is the primitive form of moral affection. The man who is still incapable of self-respect may nevertheless perhaps respect superior natures. Fichte elaborated this idea in considerable detail in his famous Reden an die deutsche Nation (1808) as the foundation of a theory of national education. The spontaneous adoption or creation of ideal types forms the middle term between passive admiration and perfect liberty.

According to Fichte the religious consciousness is really implied in the moral consciousness. For the very fact that I strive to realize my highest ideal assumes at the same time that the realization of this ideal by my