Page:A Brief History of Modern Philosophy.djvu/159

 moral element appears most clearly in cases where duty and inclination stand out in sharp contrast. Kant even says in a certain place that a state of mind in which I follow duty even though it is in conflict with my purposes is the only one which is really good in itself.

The moral law must be purely formal. Every real content, every purpose would degrade it to the level of the empirical and hence to the material. The moral law can do nothing more than indicate the form of the fundamental principles which our actions are intended to express,— that is to say, that these fundamental principles are capable of being based on a universal principle of legislation in such manner as to enable all rational beings to obey them under similar circumstances. I must, e. g. return borrowed property even though no one knows that it does not belong to me; because the contrary course will not admit of generalization, and in that case no one would make a loan to another. Kant however here clearly presupposes that man is a member of society. This maxim is therefore not purely a priori. He likewise realizes the need of a more realistic formulation of the maxim and the necessity of a real object of human action. The highest object can be given only through the moral law, and Kant discovers this object in the very dignity which every man possesses in the fact of being capable of becoming conscious of the moral law. From this he deduces the principle: "Act so as to treat humanity, in thyself or any other, as an end always, and never merely as a means!"

The moral law is not objective, but deeply imbedded in the nature of man and identical with the essential nature of volition. Law and liberty are not separate concepts. They express only the autonomy of man viewed from opposite sides. As an empirical being man is subject to