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 agreed with Georgia, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, using a three-part test that considered whether the annotations were constructively authored by citizens. See id. at 1505–06.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit but announced a different rule: that the government edicts doctrine—under which officials empowered to speak with the force of law cannot be the authors of, and therefore cannot copyright, the works they create in the course of their official duties—applies equally to “non-binding, explanatory legal materials created by a legislative body vested with the authority to make law.” Id. at 1503 (emphasis in original). The Court based its rule in significant part on its construction of the term “author,” noting that judges and legislators could not be considered authors entitled to copyright in their official works because those officials were “vested with the authority to make and interpret the law.” Id. at 1507. As a corollary to its author-focused rule, the Supreme Court added that the government edicts doctrine “does not apply, however, to works created by … private parties[ ] who lack the authority to make or interpret the law.” Id.

The Court went on to note: “The animating principle behind [the government edicts doctrine] is that no one can own the law. Every citizen is presumed to know the law, and it needs no argument to show … that all should have free access to its contents.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Summary judgment may be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine