Page:ASTM v. PRO (D.C. Cir. 2018).pdf/9

 Based on these liability findings, the court issued permanent injunctions prohibiting PRO from all unauthorized use of the ten standards identified in the summary judgment motions and of ASTM’s registered trademarks.

PRO appeals the district court’s injunctions, and the underlying partial summary judgment orders. Although “[a]n order granting partial summary judgment is usually considered a nonappealable interlocutory order,” because this “order granted an injunction,” we may consider the entire appeal “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).” Gomez v. Turner, 672 F.2d 134, 138 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1982). “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court and drawing all inferences from the evidence in favor of the non-movant.” Estate of Coll-Monge v. Inner Peace Movement, 524 F.3d 1341, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). We consider the copyright issues in Part II and the trademark issues in Part III.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, of the Constitution empowers Congress “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The very first Congress took up that charge in the Copyright Act of 1790, which granted authors of certain works “the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending” those works “for the term of fourteen years.” Act of May 31, 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124.

In the ensuing two centuries, although the precise contours of the Act have changed, Congress’s purpose has remained constant:

"The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings … but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings."

H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909); see also Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429, 104 S.Ct. 774, 18 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984) (This “limited grant” is “intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”). The challenge with each iteration of the Act, both for its drafters and its interpreters, has been to strike the “difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand.” Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429, 104 S.Ct. 774.

Under the current Act, “[c]opyright protection subsists … in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). This copyright, which “vests initially in the author or authors of the work,” id. § 201(a), and generally endures for at least “70 years after the author’s death,” id. § 302(a), endows authors with “exclusive rights” to use or authorize the use of their work in six statutorily specified ways, including “reproduc[ing] the copyrighted work” and “distribut[ing] copies … of the copyrighted work to the public,” id. § 106. “Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner … is an infringer of the copyright,” id. § 501(a),