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Rh paragraphs in its free-speech analysis. See Brief for Respondents 44–45; 6 F. 4th, at 1182–1183.) The dissent even suggests that our decision today is akin to endorsing a “separate but equal” regime that would allow law firms to refuse women admission into partnership, restaurants to deny service to Black Americans, or businesses seeking employees to post something like a “White Applicants Only” sign., , , , , and , . Pure fiction all.

In some places, the dissent gets so turned around about the facts that it opens fire on its own position. For instance: While stressing that a Colorado company cannot refuse “the full and equal enjoyment of [its] services” based on a customer’s protected status,, the dissent assures us that a company selling creative services “to the public” does have a right “to decide what messages to include or not to include,”. But if that is true, what are we even debating?

Instead of addressing the parties’ stipulations about the case actually before us, the dissent spends much of its time adrift on a sea of hypotheticals about photographers, stationers, and others, asking if they too provide expressive services covered by the First Amendment. ,, . But those cases are not this case. Doubtless, determining what qualifies as expressive activity protected