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20 seeks to compel “pure speech,” 6 F. 4th, at 1176. The dissent chides us for deciding a pre-enforcement challenge. But it ignores the Tenth Circuit’s finding that Ms. Smith faces a credible threat of sanctions unless she conforms her views to the State’s. 6 F. 4th, at 1172–1175. The dissent suggests (over and over again) that any burden on speech here is “incidental.”, ,. All despite the Tenth Circuit’s finding that Colorado intends to force Ms. Smith to convey a message she does not believe with the “very purpose” of “[e]liminating … ideas” that differ from its own. 6 F. 4th, at 1178.

Nor does the dissent’s reimagination end there. It claims that, “for the first time in its history,” the Court “grants a business open to the public” a “right to refuse to serve members of a protected class.” ; see also,. Never mind that we do no such thing and Colorado itself has stipulated Ms. Smith will (as CADA requires) “work with all people regardless of … sexual orientation.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 184a. Never mind, too, that it is the dissent that would have this Court do something truly novel by allowing a government to coerce an individual to speak contrary to her beliefs on a significant issue of personal conviction, all in order to eliminate ideas that differ from its own.

There is still more. The dissent asserts that we “sweep under the rug petitioners’ challenge to CADA’s Communication Clause.” This despite the fact the parties and the Tenth Circuit recognized that Ms. Smith’s Communication Clause challenge hinges on her Accommodation Clause challenge. (So much so that Colorado devoted less than two pages at the tail end of its brief to the Communication Clause and the Tenth Circuit afforded it just three