Page:303 Creative LLC v. Elenis.pdf/25

Rh the dissemination of purely factual and uncontroversial information,” particularly in the context of “commercial advertising.” Hurley, 515 U. S., at 573 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also NIFLA, 585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8); Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 795–796 (1988). But this case involves nothing like that. Here, Colorado does not seek to impose an incidental burden on speech. It seeks to force an individual to “utter what is not in [her] mind” about a question of political and religious significance. Barnette, 319 U. S., at 634. And that, FAIR reaffirmed, is something the First Amendment does not tolerate. No government, FAIR recognized, may affect a “speaker’s message” by “forc[ing]” her to “accommodate” other views, 547 U. S., at 63; no government may “ ‘alter’ ” the “ ‘expressive content’ ” of her message, id., at 63–64 (alteration omitted); and no government may “interfer[e] with” her “desired message,” id., at 64.

It is difficult to read the dissent and conclude we are looking at the same case. Much of it focuses on the evolution of public accommodations laws,, and the strides gay Americans have made towards securing equal justice under law,. And, no doubt, there is much to applaud here. But none of this answers the question we face today: Can a State force someone who provides her own expressive services to abandon her conscience and speak its preferred message instead?

When the dissent finally gets around to that question—more than halfway into its opinion—it reimagines the facts of this case from top to bottom. The dissent claims that Colorado wishes to regulate Ms. Smith’s “conduct,” not her speech. Forget Colorado’s stipulation that Ms. Smith’s activities are “expressive,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 181a, and the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that the State