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Rh Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 505–506 (1969); see also, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 256 (1974); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714 (1977); National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (NIFLA) (slip op., at 8). Nor does it matter whether the government seeks to compel a person to speak its message when he would prefer to remain silent or to force an individual to include other ideas with his own speech that he would prefer not to include. See Hurley, 515 U. S., at 568–570, 576; see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U. S. 47, 63–64 (2006) (FAIR) (discussing cases). All that offends the First Amendment just the same.

Applying these principles to this case, we align ourselves with much of the Tenth Circuit’s analysis. The Tenth Circuit held that the wedding websites Ms. Smith seeks to create qualify as “pure speech” under this Court’s precedents. 6 F. 4th, at 1176. We agree. It is a conclusion that flows directly from the parties’ stipulations. They have stipulated that Ms. Smith’s websites promise to contain “images, words, symbols, and other modes of expression.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 181a. They have stipulated that every website will be her “original, customized” creation. Id., at 181a–182a. And they have stipulated that Ms. Smith will create these websites to communicate ideas—namely, to “celebrate and promote the couple’s wedding and unique love story” and to “celebrat[e] and promot[e]” what Ms. Smith understands to be a true marriage. Id., at 186a–187a.

A hundred years ago, Ms. Smith might have furnished her services using pen and paper. Those services are no less protected speech today because they are conveyed with a “voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.” Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844,