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 skirmish, although local commanders quickly diffused the clash and the overall standoff did not substantively escalate.



The PRC and Japan have overlapping claims to both the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the (ECS). The ECS contains natural gas and oil, although hydrocarbon reserves are difficult to estimate. Japan maintains that an equidistant line from each country involved should separate the EEZs, while China claims an extended continental shelf beyond the equidistant line to the Okinawa Trench. The PRC continues to assert sovereignty over the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands and reiterate the importance of abiding by the fourpoint consensus signed in 2014, which states both sides will acknowledge divergent positions over the ECS dispute but also prevent escalation through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management mechanisms. Japan remains concerned with the persistent deployment of PRC coast guard ships and fishing vessels in disputed ECS waters and contests the PRC’s claim of sovereignty.

The (SCS) plays an important role in security considerations across East Asia because Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil and commerce through SCS shipping lanes, including more than 80 percent of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. China claims sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands and other land features within its ambiguous self-proclaimed “nine-dash line” claims disputed in whole or part by Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Taiwan, which occupies Itu Aba Island in the Spratly Islands, makes the same territorial assertions as the PRC. The PRC continued to employ the PLA Navy (PLAN), China Coast Guard, and maritime militia to patrol the region throughout 2022. In response to China’s continued assertive actions, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam