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 Ambassador Sondland further testified that President Trump expressedboth directly and through Mr. Giulianithat he wanted “a public statement from President Zelensky committing to the investigations of Burisma and the 2016 election” as “prerequisites for the White House call and the White House meeting.”554 Ambassador Sondland explained:


 * I know that members of this committee frequently frame these complicated issues in the form of a simple question: Was there a quid pro quo? As I testified previously with regard to the requested White House call and the White House meeting, the answer is yes.555

Ambassador Sondland also testified that knowledge of this quid pro quo was widespread among the President’s advisers: “Everyone was in the loop” about the President’s expectation that President Zelensky had to announce these specific investigations to secure an Oval Office meeting. As an example, Ambassador Sondland cited an emailcopying Senior Advisor to the White House Chief of Staff Robert Blair, State Department Executive Secretary Lisa Kenna, Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Energy Brian McCormack, Mr. Mulvaney, Secretary Perry, and Secretary Pompeowhere “[e]veryone was informed.”556

Other U.S. government officials also understood this scheme as a quid pro quo. Ambassador Taylor testified that as early as mid-July, it was “becoming clear” to him that “the meeting President Zelensky wanted was conditioned on investigations of Burisma and alleged Ukrainian influence in the 2016 elections” and that “this condition was driven by the irregular policy channel I had come to understand was guided by Mr. Giuliani.”557 Mr. Holmes similarly understood that by July, “it was made clear that some action on a Burisma/Biden investigation was a precondition for an Oval Office visit.”558 Dr. Hill testified that this quid pro quo was readily apparent after reading the July 25 call summary, explaining that it revealed that the White House meeting was used as “some kind of asset” that was “dangled out to the Ukrainian Government” to secure a political benefit.559

Ambassador Taylor testified that the call between President Trump and President Zelensky that ultimately occurred on July 25 was not confirmed until the last minute: “We were trying to schedule it for about a week in advance, that whole week. As I say, back and forth, yes, no, this time, that time. … it may have been about the day before that it was actually locked down, so about the 24th.”560 According to Ambassador Taylor, at least one person had prescient concerns about the call before it occurred: “Ambassador Bolton was not interested in havingdid not want to have the call because he thought it was going to be a disaster. He thought that there could be some talk of investigations or worse on the call.”561

Before the call took place on July 25, Ambassador Volker had lunch with Mr. Yermak in Kyiv. Ambassador Volker followed up with a text message to Mr. Yermak approximately 30 minutes before the call, noting that a White House visit was still on the table if, during the call, President Zelensky convinced President Trump that Ukraine would “investigate” and “get to the bottom of what happened” in 2016: