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 final policy direction.”$423$ As mentioned above, Mr. Sandy testified that this sentence was at “the heart of that issue about ensuring that we don’t run afoul of the Impoundment Control Act.”$424$

As a result of DOD’s concerns, all of the subsequent footnotes issued by OMB during the pendency of the holdapproved by Mr. Duffey on August 20, 27, and 31, and September 5, 6, and 10removed the sentence regarding DOD’s ability to fully obligate by the end of the fiscal year.$425$ Each footnote extended the hold for a period of two to six days.$426$

Mr. Sandy and his staff “continued to express concerns [to Mr. Duffey] about the potential implications vis-à-vis the Impoundment Control Act,”$427$ and advised Mr. Duffey to consult with OMB’s Office of General Counsel “on every single footnote.”$428$ Mr. Sandy was copied on emails with the Office of General Counsel on these topics.$429$ Although Mr. Sandy understood that the Office of General Counsel supported the footnotes, he noted that there were dissenting opinions within the Office of General Counsel.$430$ Concerns about whether the Administration was bending, if not breaking, the law by holding back this vital assistance contributed to at least two OMB officials resigning, including one attorney in the Office of General Counsel.$431$ Mr. Sandy testified that the resignation was motivated in part by concerns about the way OMB was handling the hold on Ukraine security assistance.$432$ According to Mr. Sandy, the colleague disagreed with the Office of General Counsel about the application of the Impoundment Control Act to the hold on Ukraine security assistance.$433$

Nevertheless, at the direction of the President, OMB continued to implement the hold through September 11.

Sometime prior to August 16, Ambassador Bolton had a one-on-one meeting with President Trump about the aid.$434$ According to Mr. Morrison, at that meeting the President “was not yet ready to approve the release of the assistance.”$435$ Following the meeting, Ambassador Bolton instructed Mr. Morrison to look for opportunities to get the principals together “to have the direct, in-person conversation with the President about this topic.”$436$

On or about August 13 or 14, Lt. Col. Vindman was directed to draft a Presidential Decision Memorandum for Ambassador Bolton and the other principals to present to President Trump for a decision on Ukraine security assistance.$437$ The memorandum, finalized on August 15, recommended that the hold should be lifted, explained why, and included the consensus views from the July 26 meeting that the funds should be released.$438$ Lt. Col. Vindman received conflicting accounts about whether the memorandum was presented to the President.$439$

Mr. Morrison, who was Lt. Col. Vindman’s supervisor at the NSC and agreed with the recommendation to lift the hold, testified that the memorandum was never provided to the President.$440$ Mr. Morrison explained that Ambassador Bolton intended to present the memorandum to the President during an unrelated meeting in Bedminster, New Jersey, on August 15, but the “other subject matter of that meeting consumed all the time.”$441$ However, while at Bedminster, the principals “all represented to Ambassador Bolton that they were prepared to tell the President they endorsed the swift release and disbursement of the funding.”$442$