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73

Enclosure to Tokyo's

Despatch No. 806,

November 19, 1949.

up and those which Japan retains. It is believed, however, that the method of delineation employed in this Article has serious psychological disadvantages. If possible, it is recommended that another method of description be employed which avoids circumscribing Japan with a line even if it is necessary to enumerate a large number of territories in an annex. We suggest that the practicability be explored of defining Japan territorially in positive terms, altering Article 3 approximately as follows: retain the first six lines of the draft of paragraph 1; name further islands as necessary off the coasts of Japan; continue with the words "and all other islands nearer therefrom to the home islands of Japan"; and conclude Article 3 with the statement that "all islands within the area described, with a three-mile belt of territorial waters, shall belong to Japan".

In any event, the omission of paragraph 2 and of the map is recommended.

Following such a revised Article 3 an article might advisably be inserted stating that Japan hereby cedes and renounces all territory, mandate, and concession rights, titles, and claims outside the territorial area described in Article 3.

(It is noted that in the November 2 draft the principle of renunciation by Japan without direct cession to a new sovereign is recognized in Articles 8 through 12.)

. We suggest that in the treaty Articles 4 through 12 of the November 2 draft be omitted, and that in a document subsidiary to the treaty among the signatories other than Japan the disposition of territories formerly under Japanese jurisdiction be agreed upon. The necessity of direct cession would thereby be removed from the treaty proper and Japan would not rest under the necessity of being a party to it.

In the subsidiary agreement, with regard to Taiwan it is suggested that consideration be given to the question of a plebiscite to determine for or against a United Nations trusteeship, on the ground that disturbed conditions in China intervening since the Cairo Conference invalidate any automatic disposition of the Island. (The discussion in the pertinent footnote of the November 2 draft, which takes into account the contingency of China's possible failure to sign the treaty, seems to us an inadequate treatment of the important political and strategic factors involved in determining the disposition of Taiwan.)

With regard to the disposition of islands east and northeast of Hokkaido to be proposed in such subsidiary agreement, it is suggested that the draft to be supplied to the United Kingdom and British Commonwealths by the United States contain a provision for the "ceding to the Soviet Union in full sovereignty of the Kuril Islands, being those islands eastward and northeastward from the mid-channel line between Etorofu