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proceeded to minimize the meaning of their language. The Khedive was practically compelled to form a government in which Arabi was Minister of War and Mahmoud Sami Premier, and Arabi took steps to extend his influence throughout his army. The situation now became critically serious: for the third time ships were sent to Alexandria, and on 25th May 1882 the ConsulsGeneral of the two Powers made a strong representation to Mahmoud Sami which produced the resignation of the Egyptian Ministry, and a demand, to which the Khedive yielded, by the military party for the reinstatement of Arabi. The attitude, of the troops in Alexandria now became threatening; and on the 29th the British residents pointed out that they were “ absolutely defenceless.” This warning w^as amply justified by the massacres of 11th June, during which more than one hundred persons, including an officer and two seamen, were killed in the streets of Bombard- Alexandria, almost under the guns of the ships meat of in harbour. It was becoming clear that definite Alexaa- action would have to be taken, and on the 15th dria. the Channel Squadron was ordered to Malta. By the end of June twenty-six warships, representing the navies of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Russia, the United States, Spain, Greece, and Turkey, lay off the port of Alexandria, and large numbers of refugees were embarked. The order received by Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour on 3rd July was as follows:— Prevent any attempt to bar channel into port. If work is resumed on earthworks, or fresh guns mounted, inform Military Commander that you have orders to prevent it; and if not immediately discontinued, destroy earthworks and silence batteries if they open fire, having given sufficient notice to population, shipping, and foreign men-of-war. On the 9th the Admiral received a report that working parties had been seen in Fort Silsileh “ parbuckling two smooth-bore guns—apparently 32-pounders—towards their respective carriages and slides, which were facing in the direction of the harbour.” Fort Silsileh was an old work at the extrema east of the defences of Alexandria, and its guns do not bear on the harbour. On the 10th an ultimatum was sent to Toulba Pasha, the Military Commandant, intimating that the bombardment would commence at sunrise on the following morning unless “ the batteries on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the harbour of Alexandria ” were previously surrendered “for the purpose of disarming.” The fleet prepared for action, and the bearer of the reply, signed by the President of the Council, and offering to dismount three guns in the batteries named,. only succeeded in finding the flagship late at night. This proposal was rejected, and at 7 a.m. on 11th July the Alexandra opened fire and the action became general. The attacking force was disposed in three groups : (1) the Alexandra, Sultan, and Superb, outside the reef, to engage the Ras-el-Tin and the earth works under weigh; (2) the Monarch, Invincible, and Penelope, inside the harbour, to engage the Meks batteries; and (3) the Inflexible and Temeraire, to take up assigned stations outside the reef and to co-operate with the inshore squadron. The gunboats Beacon, Bittern, Condor, Cygnet, and Decoy were to keep out of fire at first and seek opportunities of engaging the Meks batteries. Meks fort was silenced by about 12.45 p.m., and a party from the Invincible landed and disabled the guns. As the fire delivered under way was not effective, the offshore squadron anchored at about 10.30 a.m., and succeeded in silencing Fort Ras-el-Tin at about 12.30 p.m., and Fort Adda, by the explosion of the main magazine, at 1.35 p.m. The Inflexible weighed soon after 8 a.m. and engaged Ras-el-Tin, afterwards attacking Forts Pharos and Adda. The Condor, followed by the Beacon, Bittern, and Decoy, engaged Fort Marabout soon

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after 8 a.m. till 11 a.m., when the gunboats were recalled. After the works were silenced, the ships moved in closer, with a view to dismount the Egyptian guns. The bombardment ceased at 5 p.m.; but a few rounds were fired by the Inflexible and Temeraire on the morning of the 12 th at the right battery in Ras-el-Tin lines. The bombardment of the forts of Alexandria is interesting as a gauge of the effect to be expected from the fire of ships under specially favourable conditions. The Egyptians at different times during the day brought into action about 33 R.M.L. guns (7-inch to 10-inch), 3 R.B.L. guns (40 prs.), and 120 S.B. guns (6'5-inch and 10-inch), with a few mortars. These guns were disposed over a coast-line of about 10 sea miles, and were in many cases indifferently mounted. The Egyptian gunners had been little trained, and many of them had never once practised* vith rifled ordnance. Of seventy-five hits on the hulls of the ships only five can with certainty be ascribed to projectiles from rifled guns, and thirty were unquestionably due to the old smoothbores, which were not provided with sights. The total loss inflicted was 6 killed and 27 wounded. The British ships engaged fired 1741 heavy projectiles. (7-inch to 16-inch) and 1457 light (7-prs. to 64-prs.), together with 33,493 machine-gun and rifle bullets. The result was comparatively small. About 8 rifled guns and 19 smoothbores were dismounted or disabled and 4 and 1 temporarily put out of action respectively. A considerable portion of this injury was inflicted, after the works had been silenced, by the deliberate fire of the ships. As many as twenty-eight rifled guns and 140 smoothbores would have opened fire on the following day. The Egyptians made quite as good a stand as could be expected, but were driven from their guns, which they were unable to use with adequate effect; and the bombardment of Alexandria confirms previous experience, that the fire of ships cannot really compete with that of well-mounted and well-handled guns on shore. In the afternoon of the 12 th, fires, which were the work of incendiaries, began to break out in the best quarters of Alexandria; and the town was left to murder and pillage till the following day, when a party of bluejackets and marines was landed at about 3 p.m. Military intervention being now imperatively demanded,, a vote of credit for £2,300,000 was passed in the British House of Commons on 27th July. Five days later the French Government failed to secure a similar vote, and Great Britain was left to deal with the Egyptian question alone. An expeditionary force detailed from home stationsand from Malta was organized in two divisions, with a cavalry division, corps troops, and a siege Britisb train, numbering in all about 25,000 men. expedition An Indian contingent numbering about 7000 under sir combatants, complete in all arms and with its own transport, was prepared for despatch to 0 se y" Suez. General Sir Garnet Wolseley was appointed Commander-in-Chief, with Lieut.-General Sir J. Adye as Chief of the Staff. The plan of operations contemplated the seizure of Ismailia as the base for an advance on Cairo, Alexandria and its suburbs to be held defensively, and the Egyptian forces in the neighbourhood to be occupied by demonstrations. The expeditionary force having rendezvoused at Alexandria, means were taken by Rear-Admiral Hoskins and Sir W. Hewett for the seizure of the Suez Canal. Under orders from the former, Captain Fairfax, R.N., occupied Port Said on the night of 19th August, and Commander Edwards, R.N., proceeded down the Canal, taking possession of the gares and dredgers, while Captain Fitzroy, R.N., occupied Ismailia after slight opposition. Before nightfall on 20th August the Canal was wholly in British hands. Meanwhile, leaving Sir EHamley in command at Alexandria, Sir G. Wolseley with the bulk of the expeditionary force arrived at Port Said on 20th August, a naval demonstration having been made at Abukir with a view to deceive the enemy as to the object of the great movement in progress. The advance from Ismailia now began. On the 21st Major-General Graham moved from Ismailia with about 800 men anc a small naval force, occupying Kefiche, the junction with the Suez line, at 1.30 a.m. without opposition. On the