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 COALING gencies of trade, and began later to supply the needs of navies. For many years there was no inquiry into the war requirements of the British fleet as regards coal, and no attempt to regularize . or to fortify the ports at which it was stored. Successful naval war had won for Great Britain many oints of vaut sNations P age throughout tire world, andproved in some ' cases the strategic value of ports had been by actual experience. The extreme importance of the Cape of Good Hope, obscured for a time after the opening of the Suez Canal, was fully realized in sailing days, and the naval conditions of those days to some extent determined the choice of islands and harbours for occupation. There does not, however, appear to have been any careful study of relative strategic values. Treaties were occasionally drafted by persons whose geographical knowledge was at fault, and positions were, in some cases, abandoned which ought to have been retained, or tenaciously held when they might have been abandoned. It was left to the personal exertions of Sir Stamford Raffles to secure such a supremely important roadstead as that of Singapore for the empire. Although, therefore, the relative values of positions was not always recognized, Great Britain obtained as a legacy from sailing days a large number of harbours admirably adapted for use as coaling stations. Since the dawn of the era of steam, she has acquired Aden, Perim, Hong Kong, North Borneo, Fiji, part of New Guinea, Fanning Island, and many other islands in the Pacific, while the striking development of Australia and New Zealand has added to the long roll of British ports. The coaling stations, actual and potential, of the empire are unrivalled in number, in convenience of geographical distribution, and in resources. Of the numerous British ports abroad which contained coal stores, only the four so-called “ fortresses’’—Gibraltar, Malta, Halifax, and Bermuda—were at first fortified as naval stations after the introduction of rifled ordnance. The term fortress is a misnomer in every case except Gibraltar, which, being a peninsula separated only by a neck of neutral ground from the territory of a foreign Power, exists under fortress conditions. Large sums were expended on these places with little regard to principles, and the defences of Bermuda, which were very slowly constructed, are monuments of misapplied ingenuity. In 1878 great alarm arose from strained relations with Russia. Rumours of the presence of Russian cruisers in many waters, and of hostile projects, were readily believed, although the Russian navy, which had just shown itself unable to face that of Turkey, would Carnarvon as *' reacl fears periodforhave the been practically powerless. WideCommis- P security of coaling stations led to sion. commission, the appointment presidency of ofthea strong earl ofroyal Carnarvon, whichunder was instructed to inquire into and report upon the protection of British commerce at sea. This was the first attempt to formulate any principles, or to determine which of the many ports where coal was stored should be treated as coaling stations essential for the purposes of war. The terms of the reference to the commission were ill-conceived. The basis of all defence of sea-borne commerce is a mobile navy. It is the movement of commerce upon the sea during war, not its security in port, that is essential to the British Empire, and a navy able to protect commerce at sea must evidently protect ports and coaling stations. The first object of inquiry should, therefore, have been to lay down the necessary standard of naval force. The vital question of the navy was not referred to the royal commission, and the four fortresses were also strangely excluded from its purview. It followed inevitably that the protection of commerce was approached at the wrong end, and that the labours of the commission were to a great extent vitiated by the elimination of the principal factor. Voluminous and important evidence, which has not been made public, was, however, accumulated, and the final report was completed in 1881. The commissioners recalled attention to the extreme importance of the Cape route to the East; they carefully examined the main maritime communications of the empire, and the distribution of trade upon each ; they selected certain harbours for defence, and they obtained from the War Office and endorsed projects of fortification in every case ; lastly, they condemned the great dispersion of troops in the West Indies, which had arisen in days when it was a political object to keep the standing army out of sight of the British people, and had since, been maintained by pure inadvertence. Although the principal outcome of the careful inquiries of the commission was to initiate a great system of passive defence, the able reports were a.distinct gain. Some principles were at last formulated by authority, and the information collected, if it had been rendered accessible to the public, would have exercised a beneficial influence upon opinion. Moreover, the commissioners, overstepping the bounds of their charter, delivered a wise and statesmanlike warning as to the position of the navy. Meanwhile, the impulse of the fears of 1878 caused indifferent

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armaments to be sent to Cape Town, Singapore, and Hong Kong, there to be mounted after much delay in roughly designed works. At the same time, the great colonies of Australasia began to set about the defence of their ports with commendable earnestness. There is no machinery for giving effect to the recommendations of a royal commission, and until 1887, when extracts were laid before the first colonial Conference, the valuable report was veiled in secrecy. After several years, during which Lord Carnarvon persistently endeavoured to direct attention to the coaling stations, the work was begun. In 1885 a fresh panic arose out of the Panjdeh difficulty, which supplied an impetus to the belated proceedings. Little had then been accomplished, and the works were scarcely completed before the introduction of long breech-loading guns rendered their armaments obsolete. The fortification of the coaling stations for the British Empire is still proceeding on a scale which, in some cases, cannot easily be reconciled with the principles laid down by the president of the Cabinet committee of defence. At the Guildhall, London, on 3rd December 1896, the duke of Devonshire stated that “ The maintenance of sea supremacy has been assumed as the basis of the system of imperial defence against attack from over the sea. This is the determining factor in fixing the whole defensive policy of the empire.” It was, however, he added, necessary to provide against “ the predatory raids of cruisers” ; but “it is in the highest degree improbable that this raiding attack would be made by more than a few ships, nor could it be of any permanent effect unless troops were landed.” This is an unexceptionable statement of the requirements of passive defence in the case of the coaling stations of the British Empire. Their protection must depend primarily on the navy. Their immobile armaments are needed to ward off a raiding attack, and a few effective guns, well mounted, manned by welltrained men, and kept in full readiness, will amply suffice. If the command of the sea is lost, large expeditionary forces can be brought to bear upon coaling stations, and their security will thus depend upon their mobile garrisons, not upon their passive defences. In any case, where coal is stored on shore, it cannot be destroyed by the fire of a ship, and it can only be appropriated by landing men. A small force, well armed and well handled, can effectually prevent a raid of this nature without any assistance from heavy guns. In war, the possession of secure coal stores in distant ports may be a great advantage, but it will rarely suffice for the needs of a fleet engaged in offensive operations, and requiring to be accompanied or met at prearranged rendezvous by colliers from which coal can be transferred in any sheltered waters. In the British naval manoeuvres of 1892, Admiral Sir Michael ^ndi^ Seymour succeeded in coaling his squadron at tions. sea, and by the aid of mechanical appliances this is frequently possible. In the Spanish-American war of 1898 some coaling was thus accomplished ; but Guantanamo Bay served the purpose of a coaling station during the operations against Santiago. Watering at sea was usually carried out by means of casks in sailing days, and must have been almost as difficult as coaling. As, however, it is certainty of coaling in a given time that is of primary importance, the utilization of sheltered waters as improvised coaling stations is sure to be a marked feature of future naval wars. Although coaling stations are now eagerly sought for by all Powers which cherish naval ambitions, the annexation of the Sandwich Islands by the United States being a case in point, it is probable that they will play a somewhat less important part than has been assumed. A fleet which is able to assert and to maintain the command of the sea, will not find great difficulty in its coal supply. Moreover, the increased coal endurance of ships of war tends to make their necessary replenishment less frequent. On the other hand, the modern warship, being entirely dependent upon a mass of complex machinery, requires the assistance of workshops to maintain her continuous efficiency, and unless docked at intervals suffers a material reduction of speed. Prolonged operations in waters far distant from home bases will therefore be greatly facilitated in the case of the Power which possesses local docks and means of