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Iowa.) probable cause or not, and the facts found, though such as to warrant suspicion, do not necessarily lead to a belief of guilty. The inference from the general verdict is that the jury found that there was a want of probable cause, and this they might do upon the conclusion that the defendants, though believing plaintiffs explanation of his possession to be suspicious, did not believe him guilty. It is only when the special findings of fact are manifestly inconsistent with the general verdict that the special findings should control. Hardin v. Branner, 25 Iowa, 364; Clark v. Warner, 32 Iowa, 219; Mershon v. Insurance Co., 34 Iowa, 87; Connors v. Railway Co., 71 Iowa, 490, 32 N. W. Rep. 465. There is no manifest inconsistency between these findings and the verdict. They are reconcilable upon the theory that the defendants did not believe the plaintiff guilty. As it follows from these conclusions that appellants' motion for judgment on the special findings was rightly overruled, it is unnecessary that we notice the discussion as to the defendants' liability for the finding of the second indictment.

5. A motion in arrest of judgment is only available “if the facts stated by the petition do not entitle the plaintiff to any relief whatever.” Code, § 2650. The ground of defendants’ motion is that the court having instructed the jury to find for the defendants, on the charge of conspiracy, there were no allegations upon which a joint judgment could be rendered against the defendants. It is a sufficient answer to say that the facts stated in the petition did entitle the plaintiff to some relief, and therefore the questions discussed could not be raised by a motion in arrest of judgment. A careful consideration of the whole record lends us to the conclusion that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

Appeal from district court, Polk county;, Judge.

Action to quiet the title to lot 22, South Park addition to Des Moines, Iowa. Plaintiff claims to be the owner of said lot by patent title, and defendant claims to own it under a tax-sale thereof for the taxes of 1877, and a deed issued thereon. Each party denies the other’s title. Decree was entered for the plaintiff; defendant appeals.

Kaufman & Guernsey, for appellant. C. C. & C. L. Nourse, for appellee.

1. B. F. Allen was the owner of the patent-title to a tract of land including the lot in question. He conveyed the tract by deed, dated February 15, and recorded March 3, 1870, articles of incorporation of the South Park Company was not incorporated when the deed was executed there was no grantee, and, therefore, the deed did not pass title to any one. It does not appear that the South Park Company either received or made conveyance of this lot as a corporation. Surely a company may be so organized as to do both without being incorporated. Assume, however, as is probably the fact, that the South Park Company did receive and convey title as a corporate body, we think the title from Allen vested in it as against one not holding by a superior title, not only because of the conveyance but because of possession taken under it.

2. The South Park Company conveyed to plaintiff by deed, wherein the description of the property is given by lots, blocks, or government subdivisions, covering over two pages of legal cap, followed with these words: “Also together with all other lands that may not have been heretofore described belonging to said South Park Co.” Appellant contends that as certain lots are expressly mentioned, that excludes all others, and as lot 22 is not mentioned it did not pass by the deed. Such a construction of this deed would be against the manifest intent of the grantor. The evident purpose was to convey all the land owned by the grantor. The lots were numerous, the description lengthy, and omissions possible. To cover any omissions and express the purpose of the parties the recital quoted was added as descriptive of what farther was conveyed. We are in no doubt but that plaintiff is the owner of lot 22, unless defendant’s tax-title divested it or its grantor of ownership.

3. The lot in controversy was sold October 21, 1878, for the taxes of 1877, to W. O. Curtis, who assigned the certificate to E. J. Adams, to whom a tax-deed was executed July 18, 1888, in pursuance of notice to redeem, served by Adamson the defendant Randell, in whose name the lot was then taxed on August 19, 1881, and on John