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Iowa.) to make special mention of but one objection. The twenty-second paragraph of the charge is as follows: "The killing of an assailant is justifiable on the grounds of self-defense only when it reasonably appears to be the only means of saving the life of the party assaulted, or preventing some great injury to his person. If it is apparent that the danger which seemed to threaten him can be avoided or prevented by any other means in his power, he is not justified in taking the life of the assailant. In determining whether the defendant in this case was justified in using a dangerous weapon in self-defense, the inquiry is not whether danger to him existed in fact, but whether, from all the attendant and surrounding circumstances at the time of the conflict, it reasonably appeared to the defendant, as a reasonable, prudent, courageous, and cautious man, that he was about to suffer death or great bodily harm at the hands of the said Louis Mars and if it so appeared to him, and if it further appeared to him to be the only means of saving his life, or preventing great bodily harm he would be justified;  otherwise, he would not be justified." The use of the word “courageous” is claimed to be erroneous. It is not to denied that a strict construction of the language employed is inaccurate. If the court had used the words “reasonably” instead of “reasonable” in connection with the words “prudent, courageous and cautious,” it would be within the rule of responsibility prescribed by this court in numerous decisions. In view of the fact that the rule applicable to self-defense is correctly stated in several other paragraphs of the charge, we think the court surely intended to qualify the word “courageous” by the word “reasonably,” and we think the failure to do so cannot be said to be erroneous. The instructions are not necessarily repugnant to each other. A careful examination of the whole record has led us to the conclusion that the judgment should be affirmed.

(82 Iowa, 693)

Appeal from district court, Blackhawk county;, Judge.

Action for malicious prosecution. Trial by jury, verdict for plaintiff, and special findings returned. Defendants’ motion for judgment on the special findings, and in arrest of judgment, overruled, and judgment for plaintiff on the general verdict. Defendants appeal. For report of former trial, see 63 Iowa, 538, 17 N. W. Rep. 34.

Wheeler & Moffett and Woolf & Hanley, for appellants. Boies, Husted & Boles, for appellee.

1. The questions presented by this appeal arise upon defendants’ motion for judgement, and their motion in arrest of judgment. Twenty-eight special interrogatories were submitted to and answered by the jury, 2 of which were at the request of plaintiff, and 26 at the request of defendants. Defendants’ motion for judgment on the special findings is upon three grounds, namely: “(1) Because it is established hereby that defendants did not institute or commence the criminal prosecution complained of by plaintiff. (2) Upon the facts found, they are protected by the advice of counsel. (3) Upon the facts found, there was probable cause for prosecution.” The interrogatories are not only numerous, but somewhat lengthy, and it is unnecessary to an understanding of the questions discussed that we more than state their substance in connection with the questions under consideration.

2. There is no direct finding as to whether the defendants did commence the criminal prosecution complained of. In the absence of a special finding to the contrary, we must presume from the general verdict that the jury found that the defendants did commence the criminal prosecution. Such a finding was necessary to be made before they could find a verdict for plaintiff, and all questions arising in the case, not covered by the special findings, are to be considered as having been found in favor of, and covered by, the general verdict. Cook v. Howe, 77 Ind. 442; Rice v. Manford, (Ind.) 11 N. E. Rep. 284; Lassiter v. Jackman, 88 Ind. 118; Acton v. Coffman, 74 Iowa, 17, 36 N. W. Rep. 774. It is fairly inferable, from the findings hereafter noticed, that the jury did fully understand this issue, and find that the defendants not only commenced the prosecution, but did have something more to do with prosecuting a second indictment than merely to state facts within their knowledge to the district attorney.

3. In response to the second interrogatory submitted by the plaintiff, the jury found that the defendants, in the prosecution of plaintiff, did not “act in good faith, upon the advice of counsel, believing the plaintiff guilty of such charge.” The following questions submitted at the request of defendants were answered in the affirmative: “If you have answered