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 they are also therein not sufficient of themselves. Regarding 'avadēhěm, corresponding to the Aram. 'ovadēhon, vid., 'avad. The expression now following cannot mean that man does not know whether he will experience the love or hatred of God, i.e., providences of a happy nature proceeding from the love of God, or of an unhappy nature proceeding from the hatred of God (J. D. Michaelis, Knobel, Vaih., Hengst., Zöckl.), for אהבה and שׂן are too general for this, - man is thus, as the expression denotes, not the obj., but the subj. to both. Rightly, Hitz., as also Ewald: “Since man has not his actions in his own power, he knows not whether he will love or hate.” Certainly this sounds deterministic; but is it not true that personal sympathies and antipathies, from which love and hatred unfold themselves, come within the sphere of man, not only as to their objects, in consequence of the divine arrangement, but also in themselves anticipate the knowledge and the will of man? and is it less true that the love which he now cherishes toward another man changes itself, without his previous knowledge, by means of unexpected causes, into hatred, and, on the other hand, the hatred into love? Neither love nor hatred is the product of a man's self-determination; but self-determination, and with it the function of freedom, begins for the first time over against those already present, in their beginnings. In הכּל לף, “by all that is before him,” that is brought to a general expression, in which לפני has not the ethical meaning proceeding from the local: before them, prae = penes eos (vid., Song, under Sol 8:12), but the purely local meaning, and referred to time: love, hatred, and generally all things, stand before man; God causes them to meet him (cf. the use of הקרה); they belong to the future, which is beyond his power. Thus the Targ., Symm., and most modern interpreters; on the contrary, Luther: “neither the love nor the hatred of any one which he has for himself,” which is, linguistically, purely impossible; Kleinert: “Neither the love nor the hatred of things does man see through, nor anything else which is before his eyes,” for which we ought at least to have had the words לפניו גם הכל אשׁר; and Tyler: “Men discern neither love nor hatred in all that is before them,” as if the text were אשׁר בכל. The future can, it is true, be designated by אחרית, and the past by לפנים, but according to the most natural way of representation (vid., Orelli's Synon. der Zeit, p. 14) the future is that which lies before a man, and the past that which is behind him. The question is of importance, which of the two words לף הכל has the accent. If the accent be on לף, then the meaning is, that all lies before men deprived of their freedom; if the accent be on הכל, then the meaning is, that all