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Rh Secondly. The other part of Mr Mansel's objection (if I understand it aright) centres in the consideration of the infinite series of self-duplications which the mind or ego must undergo (on the terms of my system), before it can realize a single act, or compass a single object of knowledge. I confess that I am totally unable to see the necessity of this; and until the objection be presented in a clearer and more forcible manner, I must be pardoned if I deem the following answer sufficient. All that is necessary, in the eye of reason, to constitute knowledge is, that, in every cognition, there shall be a point of unity, and a point (or points) of diversity. (See Institutes prop. VI. Epistom.) But this law is fulfilled so soon as the ego turns round once upon itself (performs one act of self-duplication). It then apprehends itself, together with the other element of cognition, whatever that may be, which is not itself. And no more than this single self-duplication, or reflection on self, seems to be necessary, either for the constitution of the object, or for the performance of the act of knowledge. When Mr Mansel, in the extract quoted, speaks of "two selves," I cannot suppose him to mean that, according to my doctrine, there are two separate selves involved in the process of cognition, although his words might seem to imply that such is his understanding of my position. The ego, which is known by itself, is one and the same with that which knows itself. The other grounds on which Mr Mansel dissents from my system have been already dealt with, in the answers which I have given to my other antagonists.

To conclude: In my remarks on the Town Council of Edinburgh, I again distinctly disavow having been actuated by any private or personal considerations; and I venture to think that I have not shown any evidence of having been so. None of the issues on which such elections usually hinge are in debate between them and me. With any of the other and minor influences which may have determined their judgment, I have nothing what ever to do. These are no business of mine: I have neither right nor inclination to probe them. I have looked only to one point, and to that one point I have confined my charge. I have taxed