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52 to all kinds of knowledge, however diverse these kinds may be in all other particulars; and thus they define knowledge in a manner eminently Platonic. Socrates himself would have been satisfied with this definition of knowledge, for his illustration of the clay, prescribes the very terms mutatis mutandis, in which it is to be defined.

My opponent, as if sensible that the stability of the "Institutes" could not be shaken, unless people could be brought to swallow certain palpable contradictions, goes boldly to work. He asserts some very astonishing positions. Thus, he affirms that although mind and matter can only be known together, they can, nevertheless, be known as not existing together; and that, although matter cannot be known per se, still matter per se can be known. What would be thought of a cattle-dealer, who should say,—These cows, without their calves, cannot be sold; but they can be sold without their calves? This is exactly what my critic affirms in regard to matter per se.

In order that there may be no mistake about these contradictions, the reviewer repeats them. He first of all admits that "the relation of object and subject cannot be dissolved, as regards knowledge" (p. 140); thus admitting that the two together are required to constitute the minimum of knowledge, either by itself being insufficient. He them says,—"We deny that object plus subject constitutes the minimum of knowledge, for, if this were true, object plus subject, would be one indivisible thing, whereas, in reality, they are two things made known by one indivisible act." But, surely, if not less than two things can