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Rh him into detail, or to defend myself on points where, in spite of the confusion which is stirred up, and which presents something of the appearance of a fray, I do not appear to be attacked. It is irksome to split hairs where no result is to be gained.

A point in Mr Fraser's review, which calls for some notice, is this:—The counter-propositions of the Institutes, in which the doctrines refuted in the new philosophy are set forth, and "which are said to represent the modern doctrine (of psychology), exist hardly," says Mr Fraser, "anywhere out of Mr. Ferrier's imagination."—(Essays, p. 328.) He is particularly unfortunate, however, in the only instance which he adduces as convicting me of a mistake. The substance of my counter-propositions, IV. and V., as correctly given by Mr Fraser, is this:—"According to Scottish psychology, Matter, or at least some of its qualities, may be known per se, i.e., out of relation to any intelligence." To prove that I am wrong, and that this is not the Scottish doctrine, Mr Fraser quotes Reid as follows:—"What is a body?" asks Dr Reid. "It is, say philosophers, that which is extended, solid, and divisible. Says the querist, I do not ask what the properties of body are, but what is the thing itself—let me first know directly what body is, and then consider its properties. To this demand I am afraid the querist will meet with no satisfactory answer; because our notion of body is not direct but relative to its qualities. We know that it is something extended, solid, and divisible, but we know no more."

It is true that, in this passage, Reid does not directly assert that we have a knowledge either of matter or its qualities in their independent existence. But when we take into account his distinction of the primary and secondary qualities, which was drawn by him for the express purpose of establishing this independency—when we consider that his aim was to refute the sceptics and idealists, who had either doubted or denied the independent existence of matter; and, above all, when we attend to this most decisive circumstance, that he strove to controvert the representationists, who held that we had no immediate knowledge of material things—it is impossible to put any other