Page:(1856) Scottish Philosophy—The Old and the New.pdf/42

42 which originally appeared in the "North British Review," and which has since been republished in his "Essays in Philosophy," is written with moderation, and, on the whole, with fairness. Perhaps its worst faults are confusion of thought, absence of argument, lack of orderly arrangement,—a beating about the bush, as it is termed,—and an insufficient admission that all the difficulties and objections which it advances had been foreseen and obviated—with some show of reason at least, if not with complete success—in my work.

If I were to follow Mr Fraser step by step through his review, I should fall into the same confusion, and—I must be pardoned the expression, for it is applicable—circumlocutory tediousness, with himself. I shall therefore take hold only of the more important and salient points of his critique, arranging them in the order which seems most conducive to clearness and intelligibility.

The fundamental assumption on which my system proceeds is the legitimacy of extending to all knowledge and all reason certain necessary laws of our knowledge and our reason. Mr Fraser refuses to grant this postulate: and on the ground of this refusal he breaks down my system. But there is no great triumph in that. It was already done to his hand in the very book he was reviewing. I have proclaimed, in the most explicit terms, that unless this assumption be conceded, my system cannot work—cannot stand good for an instant. So that our relative position is this: I say to my critic, "unless you grant me a certain postulate, I cannot move." "I refuse to grant it," says my critic, "therefore you cannot move." No great discernment was required to draw that shrewd inference. Now, it seems to me that Mr Fraser has not made sufficiently apparent to the public this inability on his part and on mine to join issue on the preliminary condition of the research. Not being able to join issue on this topic, there can be no controversy between us. Yet Mr Fraser would fain persuade people that he and I are at loggerheads. This, I say, is throwing dust, no doubt unintentionally, in the eyes of metaphysical students.

Perhaps it may be supposed that Mr Fraser has assigned reasons for his denial of my postulate. He has assigned none.