Page:(1856) Scottish Philosophy—The Old and the New.pdf/22

22 Mr Cairns cannot allege that this is a confounding of logic and metaphysics; for, surely, if we are to think and speak of real things at all, we must do so according to the laws of thought and of speech.

Attention to the very title-page of my book might have prevented Mr Cairns from publishing these inventions, and his municipal pupils from believing them. Are not the Institutes an inquiry into Knowing and Being? But who ever heard of an inquiry into a thing, unless the thing in question was taken for granted? What would be thought of a naturalist, were he, in composing a treatise on fishes, first of all, to set about proving to himself and others that there were such creatures? Would he not be thought rather a natural than a naturalist? Such very reasonably might I have been thought, if I had ever dreamt of proving to the world, either that Knowledge was, or that Being was. I assume, on my title-page, and in every word of my book, that both of them are.

My accuser might allege, with just as much truth, that the geometrician attempts to prove that he has in his mind those conceptions which he calls lines, circles, and triangles. Perhaps Mr Cairns actually supposes that such proof is part of geometry. If so, he is mistaken. The geometrician never attempts, and is not called upon, to prove that he has these conceptions. This is always conceded to him. He merely proves what the nature and properties and relations of these ideal figures are. So in regard to Knowing and Being; I hold these conceded, and merely prove what they are in their nature and relations.

Shall I let the Town Council into the secret—shall I tell them what it was that set their reverend adviser upon this false statement, and made him expect that it would go down? It was this. Hegel has written a metaphysical work, which he calls logic. Hence, argues Mr Cairns, the metaphysics of Professor Ferrier, who is obviously a Hegelian, must be identical with logic. Hegel makes no distinction between logic and metaphysics—therefore Ferrier makes none. But I have shown that I am no follower of Hegel. I cannot follow what I do not understand; therefore I have imported none of the opinions of that philosopher,