Page:(1848) Observations on Church and State- JF Ferrier.pdf/14

14 the light of theory and of history. At the commencement of the Scottish Reformation, when the question as to ecclesiastical legislation arose, two modes of settling it were open to the option of the public. We hold it to be a settled point that the church government was not to be placed in the hands of the clergy; but there were two other modes of disposing of it. One of these was to incorporate the clergy, or such proportion of them as might be thought expedient, together with certain representatives of the different congregations—to incorporate them with the already existing Parliament of the nation. Had this plan been adopted, then, when ecclesiastical affairs came under the consideration of the House, the House would have been an ecclesiastical assembly—just as the General Assembly may now, with propriety, be regarded as an ecclesiastical assembly, provided we give it that appellation on account of the matters treated of, and not on account of the persons who deliberate there. The Scottish Parliament would in these circumstances have been conveniently denominated a civil assembly when it deliberated on civil affairs, and an ecclesiastical assembly when it deliberated on ecclesiastical affairs. Its two denominations would have given rise to no confusion—the conflict of “civil and spiritual jurisdiction” could never have arisen. But this plan the clergy strenuously opposed. They resolutely refused to accept a place in Parliament, though the offer was repeatedly pressed upon them. And there were good grounds for their refusal. The affairs of commerce, and the affairs of agriculture, present no such striking points of discrepancy as to require separate boards of legislation. One and the same council may undertake both classes of affairs, and get through much other business besides. But Time and Eternity are grander categories than any other two under which human interests can be ranged. Here is the broadest and the deepest distinction which man's intellect can make—a distinction broader and deeper than he can comprehend. Here, if anywhere, is a distinction which may justify the setting up of two separate legislative councils; justify their setting up—not as a compliment to “ecclesiastical” men, vainly so called—but as a tribute to things in reference to which the word “ecclesiastical” is not an unmeaning sound. Out of respect, then, for the character of sacred things, well and wisely was it urged, that those men who