Page:"The next war"; an appeal to common sense (IA thenextwarappeal01irwi).pdf/89

, proved its distinct value. Many naval men say that the Germans made the same mistake with their submarines that they did with their gases, and that the British did with their tanks. They did not realize the power in their hands. Had they begun the war with as many submarines as they manned in 1917, had they stuck from first to last to their policy of sinking without warning, they might have starved out England and won. The submarine grew mightily in speed, in cruising radius, in offensive power. The German U-boats of 1914 were as slow as a tub freighter; they could make only short dashes from their bases; they depended almost entirely on their torpedoes. Those of 1918 were almost as fast on the surface as an old-fashioned battleship, they proved that they could cross and re-cross the Atlantic on their own supplies of fuel, they mounted long-range five- and six-inch guns. That much greater improvement is possible, all naval designers agree. Certain naval architects hold that virtually all warships of the future will be capable of diving and traveling concealed under water—the submersible dreadnought. I shall not go into the present controversy between the experts who would stick to the surface dreadnought and those who believe in scrapping fleets and designing only submersibles. I, the landman, will not presume to judge between nautical experts. But I notice that those who adhere to the theory of surface fleets