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 North and South. Many of them seemed to think that this mediation must come at last; but they appeared to be afraid of its coming too soon. It was evident that they apprehended that a premature proposal of foreign intervention would afford the Radical party a means of reviving the violent war spirit, and thus of defeating the powerful plans of the Conservatives. They appeared to regard the present moment as peculiarly unfavorable for such an offer, and, indeed, to hold that it would be essential to the success of any proposal from abroad that it should be deferred until the control of the Executive Government should be in the hands of the Conservative party.”

So far Lord Lyons.

Foreign powers having at last found and seized upon a pretext for officially meddling with our difficulties, such as your invitation would give themand, indeed, remembering Lord Lyons's significant dispatch, this seems to be part of the Chicago programmewe shall see the working of a new agency in the affairs of this continent; an agency which, fortunately, was unknown to us as long as the country was one; and that agency is foreign influence.

The same reasons for which England and France desired the breaking up of this union, the same reasons will also impel them to do all they can to make separation permanent, and the whole of their influence, powerful as it will befor the Confederacy will necessarily lean upon her European friendswill be thrown against reünion. That influence will indeed be powerful, for it will not only extend to the Government, but it will at once run through all the channels of trade. And now is there any body credulous enough to believe that against such fearful odds you can carry out the timid scheme with a view to which you mean to stop the war? Foreign influence, once admitted, as it will be by this policy, will have the casting vote in all that pends between us and the South. We shall not have two great powers on this continent, but four, and all but one bitterly against reünion. Divide and rule, is the old saying; but not those will rule that are divided. (Applause.) Whatever our ultimate decision may be after such developments, whether to resume the war at once, or to acquiesce in separation, and then, after a short breathing spell, launch into the confusion of a new conflict, there is one thing certain: we shall find the South so immensely strengthened, that if for a people like ours any task could be hopeless, this would be hopeless indeed.

And in the same measure as the South will be strengthened by this Chicago policy, so we shall be weakened. I have already alluded to the demoralization and disintegration of our military strength by its effect. But that is not all.

At present the enlightened opinion of the liberal masses of Europe is on our side. That opinion may in a crisis prove strong enough to bridle the action of governments. How can we expect that opinion to be true to us, if we are treacherous to ourselves? With what face can we demand its generous support, if we confess a failure and throw doubt upon the justice and humanity of our own cause? You have heard of the people of Germany pouring their gold lavishly into the treasury of the United States. (Applause.) You have heard of a loan of a thousand millions having been offered, and being now in progress of negotiation. Would those people who are standing by us so generously in our embarrassments, would they have done so, if they did not trust in our ability and determination to carry through the war? And now they are told by a party that boast of being about to grasp the reigns of government, that the war is a failure, and being a failure, and being unjust, inhumane, and ruinous, must be given up. You, who are so clamorous about the condition of our treasury, do you call that raising our credit abroad, do you call that helping our finances out of a distressed condition? Truly, if it were your avowed object to reduce the Government to total impotency for want of means, to render the nation incapable of a vigorous movement, to lay it prostrate in utter helplessness at the feet of its enemies, your means could not be more judiciously chosen, you could not operate with more infernal acuteness. (Great applause.)

We may ask ourselves: How is it possible that a policy so utterly absurbabsurd [sic], reckless, and pernicious, should find any supporters among men whose sound sense and patriotism are not completely extinguished? I find the reason in a vague impression, here and there prevailing, that the Union and universal good feeling may be restored by a policy of conciliation and compromise. I find it in the generous impulses of magnanimous hearts, which insist that those who are conquered and brought to terms, should be reättached to us by a kind and forbearing treatment. There is no man in this country who would be less inclined than I to listen to the promptings of vengeance and resentment. But while we are willing to act with a sincere desire to heal all wounds by generous accommodation, do you not see, that before we find a field for that magnanimity in offering terms to the conquered, the rebels must first be conquered and brought to terms? (Applause.) And do you not further see, that if we follow the Chicago policy, the chance is rather, the rebels will be masters of the situation and bring us to terms? Still, as the feeling I speak of is vague and indefinite, and may make itself heard independently of the Chicago platform, I will say a word on compromise in its general aspect.

A compromise with the rebellion offered on our part, would necessarily contain two conditions: first, an abandonment of some essential point determined by the national election of 1860, for that was the occasion on which the rebels seceded; and secondly, the stipulation that the rebels shall give up the struggle and return to their allegiance. Every sensible man who has his eyes open, knows that the rebels will certainly reject a compromise containing the second stipulation, as long as they entertain any hope of achieving their independence. The question arises, Would it be good policy to offer the first, even by way of experiment?

I have already said enough to make it evident, that as long as the rebels have confidence in their ability to win ultimate success, they will