Organon (Owen)/Topics/Book 8

Chap. 1. Of the Order of Argument.
 * 1.1. Points to be attended to by the questionist: what is common to the dialectician and to the philosopher, and what is not. Cf. Rhet. iii. 13, et seq.
 * 1.2. Certain propositions distinguished, which, non-necessary, are assumed by reasoners. Vide b. ii.-vii.
 * 1.3. Those which are necessary are to be concealed, and argued remotely.
 * 1.4. Conclusions to be named last.
 * 1.5. Propositions not to be assumed continuously.
 * 1.6. Rule to be observed as to assuming an universal prop. in the the definition.
 * 1.7. Concealment of the object of the desired concession, necessary.
 * 1.8. The desired proposition to be elicited from similitude.
 * 1.9. Rules to be observed for masking design.
 * Self-objection.
 * Custom.
 * Apparent indifference.
 * Comparison.
 * Non-proposition of assumption.
 * Question of desired assumption.
 * Extension and irrelevant amplification.
 * 1.10. Induction and division to be used for ornament.
 * 1.11. Examples, and comparisons, for illustration.

Chap. 2. Other Topics relative to Dialectic Interrogation.
 * 2.1. Of the employment of induction in disputation.
 * 2.2. When an objection may fairly be demanded, and how.
 * 2.3. How to meet it.
 * Examples.
 * 2.4. Case of denial.
 * 2.5. Direct demonstration preferable to the deduction "ad absurdum."
 * 2.6. Things to be proposed which it is difficult to meet.
 * 2.7. The conclusion not to be made a matter of petition.
 * 2.8. Not every universal, is a dialectic proposition.
 * 2.9. The same thing ought not to be repeatedly interrogated.

Chap. 3. Of Dialectic Argument generally.
 * 3.1. Things first and last, difficult to impugn, but easy to defend.
 * 3.2. Those proximate to the principle, difficult to impugn.
 * 3.3. What definitions are most difficult of attack.
 * 3.4. What difficulties hinder a confutation of an opponent's thesis.
 * 3.5. Difficulty arising from a badly enunciated definition.
 * 3.6. Whether things are to be conceded, which are more difficult than the problem itself.

Chap. 4. Of Dialectic Responsion.
 * 4.1. The duty of the questionist and of the respondent.

Chap. 5. Various Objects in Disputation of the Thesis, etc.
 * 5.1. Different method in dispute to be observed by him who wishes to teach, to overcome, and to investigate.
 * 5.2. Thesis either probable, or improbable, or neither.
 * 5.3. Duty of the respondent, as to concession, in the case of the improbable.
 * 5.4. Case of the probable.
 * 5.5. Of what is neither.
 * 5.6. Defence of what is not simply, probable or improbable.
 * 5.7. Of defending the opinion of another.

Chap. 6. Certain Rules as to Admissible Points.
 * 6.1. Of admitting and refusing those things which do, and do not, pertain to the subject.
 * Of the probable irrelevant.
 * The improbable irrelevant.
 * The probable relevant.
 * Improbable relevant.
 * Neither, and irrelevant.
 * Relevant.
 * Badness of argument, from things more improbable than the conclusion.

Chap. 7. The Practice of the Respondent in cases of Ambiguity.
 * 7.1. Respondent to confess his incomprehension of the obscure.
 * 7.2. What is to be simply admitted or denied, etc.
 * 7.3. Result of not forseeing ambiguity.

Chap. 8. Of Responsion to Induction.
 * 8.1. He is shown to argue perversely, who neither has any thing to object to an induction, nor whence he can prove the contrary.

Chap. 9. Of the Defence of the Thesis.
 * 9.1. The disputant ought to set out to himself in argument, the thesis, and the definition.
 * 9.2. But not defend an improbable hypothesis.

Chap. 10. Of the Solution of False Arguments, and of the Methods of preventing the Conclusion.
 * 10.1. In cases of false inference the cause to be investigated.
 * 10.2. Four ways of preventing an argument being conclusive.
 * 10.3. The first alone a solution.

Chap. 11. Of the Reprehension of Argument.
 * 11.1. Reprehension of arguments themselves, different from the reprehension of persons employing them.
 * 11.2. Contentious argument to be avoided.
 * 11.3. Origin of bad arguments.
 * 11.4. Reprehensions of an argument per se, five in number.
 * 11.5. Argument may be reprehensible per se, yet commendable as to the problem, or vice versâ.
 * 11.6. When the thesis is not refuted—distinction between a philosophema, an epicheirema, a sophism, and an aporema.
 * 11.7. Of the probability of the conclusion.
 * 11.8. Error of proving by circumlocution, or from things which are not evident, as to the cause whence the reasoning proceeds.

Chap. 12. Of Evident and False Reasoning.
 * 12.1. When an argument is clear.
 * 12.2. False in four ways.
 * 12.3. If it be false, whether it is the fault of the arguer, or of the argument.
 * 12.4. What we are to regard in examining argument.

Chap. 13. Of Petitio Principii, and Contraries.
 * 13.1. Petitio principii occurrent in five ways.
 * 13.2. Of the "begging" of contraries.
 * 13.3. Difference between them.

Chap. 14. Of Dialectic Exercise.
 * 14.1. Conversion of arguments, useful for dialectic exercise.
 * 14.2. Also an individual scrutiny of arguments, pro and con.
 * 14.3. Also a thorough knowledge of the most usual arguments, especially as to primary theses.
 * 14.4. An adversary's single argument, to be divided into many.
 * 14.5. And to be rendered as universal, as possible.
 * 14.6. The contrary mode to be adopted, by the disputant himself.
 * 14.7. How inductive, and syllogistic arguments are to be allotted.
 * 14.8. Object of dialectic exercise.
 * 14.9. Not every one is to be disputed with. Montaigne's Ess. xxv.
 * 14.10. Special provision to be made, as to universal arguments.

