Organon (Owen)/The Sophistical Elenchi

Chap. 1. Of Sophistical Elenchi Generally. Chap. 2. Of the Genera of Arguments. Chap. 3. Of the Objects of Sophistical Dispute. Chap. 4. Of Elenchi as to Diction. Chap. 5. Of Fallacies "extra-dictionem." Chap. 6. Of the Reference of all Fallacies to an Ignorance of the Elenchus. Chap. 7. Of the Methods of Deception. Chap. 8. Of Sophistical Syllogisms and Elenchi. Chap. 9. Of the Places of Elenchi. Chap. 10. Of the Distinction of Arguments, as to Name and as to Reason. Chap. 11. Of Difference in Elenchi. Chap. 12. Of the Demonstration of the False and the Paradoxical. Chap. 13. Of Loquacious Trifling. Chap. 14. Of Solecism. Chap. 15. Of Arrangement and Interrogation. Chap. 16. Of Reply to Sophistical Elenchi. Chap. 17. Of Solution from Probability. Chap. 18. Of True Solution. Chap. 19. Of Solution of Elenchi from Equivocation and Ambiguity. Chap. 20. Of Solution of Arguments from Composition and Division. Chap. 21. Of Solution of Arguments from Accent. Chap. 22. Of Solution of Argument from Figure of Speech. Chap. 23. Of the same generally. Chap. 24. Of Solution of Deceptions from Accident. Chap. 25. Of Solution of Arguments deduced from what is simply, etc. Chap. 26. Of Solution of Arguments from the Definition of Elenchus. Chap. 27. Of Solution of Arguments derived from petitio principii. Chap. 28. Of Solution of Deceptions from Consequents. Chap. 29. Of Solution of Deceptions from Irrelevant Assumption. Chap. 30. Of Deceptions which take many Interrogations as one. Chap. 31. On the Solution of Paralogisms leading to Repetition. Chap. 32. Of avoiding Solecisms. Chap. 33. Of the Methods of detecting the Genus of Arguments. Chap. 34. Conclusion.

Table of Contents
Chap. 1. Of Sophistical Elenchi Generally.
 * 1.1. Those not always true syllogisms, which appear so.
 * 1.2. Difference between syllogism and elenchus, cause of apparent, but unreal, syllogism.
 * 1.3. The distinction between the man of science, and the sophist.
 * 1.4. Purport of the following treatise.

Chap. 2. Of the Genera of Arguments.
 * 2.1. That there are four kinds of arguments. Connexion between this book and the Analytics and Topics.

Chap. 3. Of the Objects of Sophistical Dispute.
 * 3.1. The objects, which disputants have in view, are five.

Chap. 4. Of Elenchi as to Diction.
 * 4.1. Two-fold method of employing causes of the latter appearing from diction are six.
 * Equivocation.
 * Ambiguity.
 * Composition.
 * Division.
 * Accent.
 * Figure of speech.

Chap. 5. Of Fallacies "extra-dictionem."
 * 5.1. Species of paralogisms "extra-dictionem" are seven.
 * From accident.
 * From a thing being simply, or in a certain respect, stated.
 * From the absence of definition of syllogism or elenchus.
 * From petitio principii.
 * From the consequence by converse.
 * From a cause erroneously assumed.
 * From the conjunction of several questions.

Chap. 6. Of the Reference of all Fallacies to an Ignorance of the Elenchus.
 * 6.1. All deceptions may be referred to ignorance of syllogistic art.
 * Those in diction.
 * And those "extra-dictionem." as 1. from accident.
 * 6.2. "In a certain respect."
 * 6.3. Ellipse of definition.
 * 6.4. Petitio principii
 * 6.5. Those from the consequent (which are a part of accident).
 * 6.6. Those from making many questions one.

Chap. 7. Of the Methods of Deception.
 * 7.1. The method of deception, "specie veritatis," in the several paralogisms explained.

Chap. 8. Of Sophistical Syllogisms and Elenchi.
 * 8.1. Definition of a sophistical elenchus.
 * 8.2. All paralogisms referred to the before-named heads.
 * 8.3. A sophistical elenchus always relative.

Chap. 9. Of the Places of Elenchi.
 * 9.1. Why we must not assume from how many places confutation by elenchus occurs, without universal science.
 * 9.2. Duty of the scientific man.

Chap. 10. Of the Distinction of Arguments, as to Name and as to Reason.
 * 10.1. Error in asserting that arguments are to be distinguished as to name, and as to conception.
 * 10.2. Of the kinds of false refutation.
 * 10.3. The previous statements confirmed.
 * By mathematical questions.
 * By identifying ignorance of equivocation with the reason.
 * Absurdity of demanding a certain distinction.

Chap. 11. Of Difference in Elenchi.
 * 11.1. Definition of the sophistical, or contentious syllogism.
 * 11.2. Difference between the contentious and the sophistical.
 * 11.3. Relation of the contentious to the dialectician.
 * 11.4. Dialectic is interrogative.
 * 11.5. Also peirastic.
 * 11.6. That all men use it after a certain manner.
 * 11.7. The contentious conversant with principles of every genus.

Chap. 12. Of the Demonstration of the False and the Paradoxical.
 * 12.1. Methods of forcing the opponent to assert some falsehood or paradox.
 * To interrogate nothing definitely laid down.
 * To ask many questions.
 * Recent prevention of these.
 * To assert the question is made for the sake of learning.
 * To induce the opponent to the arguer's strong points.
 * To ascertain what the philosophers of the opponent's order—assert paradoxical.
 * From volitions and apparent opinions.
 * The place for inducing paradox, very extensive.
 * That some questions have answers either way paradoxical.

Chap. 13. Of Loquacious Trifling.
 * 13.1. How to force the opponent to repeat himself.
 * 13.2. Such arguments belong to relative notions.
 * 13.3. Cause of.

Chap. 14. Of Solecism.
 * 14.1. How to produce solecism.
 * 14.2. Whence apparent solecisms arise.
 * 14.3. That a solecism resembles an elenchus so called. Cf. ch. 4.
 * 14.4. Necessity of arranging the elements of these interrogations.

Chap. 15 Of Arrangement and Interrogation.
 * 15.1. Of certain artifices to be used by interrogators, and of the arrangement of the questions.
 * Prolixity.
 * Rapidity.
 * Alternate arrangement of questions.
 * By interrogation from negation.
 * By employing the universal as granted.
 * Assumption of a proposition to be effected through comparison of the contrary.
 * Sophistical conclusion an element of apparent confutation.
 * Case of a paradoxical position.
 * How contraries are to be investigated.
 * Plea of a double sense.
 * Withdrawal from argument in order to prevent further attack.
 * Impugning something different to the assertion.
 * Statement that in elenchi we assert contradiction.
 * The conclusion ought not to be questioned as a proposition.

Chap. 16. Of Reply to Sophistical Elenchi.
 * 16.1. What the following chapters treat of.
 * 16.2. The arguments discussed are useful to philosophy for two causes.
 * 16.3. Of the solution of sophisms generally.
 * 16.4. Necessity of argumentative exercise.

Chap. 17. Of Solution from Probability.
 * 17.1. In solution of sophistical syllogisms, not real, but apparent, confutation to be sought.
 * 17.2. Case of equivocation when the respondent cannot avoid confutation.
 * 17.3. The ambiguity to be expounded.
 * 17.4. The querist by ambiguity makes two questions, one.
 * 17.5. How reply is to be made.
 * 17.6. What is obscure in argument ought not to be simply conceded.
 * 17.7. Of certain other acts in responsion.
 * Transference of name.
 * Preliminary objections to anticipated questions.
 * Preliminary objections to anticipated questions.

Chap. 18. Of True Solution.
 * 18.1. In what consists a true solution.
 * 18.2. What considerations are to be made by those desirous of solving argument.

Chap. 19. Of Solution of Elenchi from Equivocation and Ambiguity.
 * 19:1. Difference in elenchi from ambiguity and equivocation.
 * 19:2. How ambiguous syllogisms are to be solved.

Chap. 20. Of Solution of Arguments from Composition and Division.
 * 20:1. Distinction to be drawn where there is different signification.
 * 20:2. Examples of this.

Chap. 21. Of Solution of Arguments from Accent.
 * 21.1. That few arguments are derived, —solution.

Chap. 22. Of Solution of Argument from Figure of Speech.
 * 22.1. Error of these sophisms pointed out to consist in their taking different things for the same, referring those to the same category which belong to different categories. Examples.
 * 22.2. Examples continued.
 * 22.3. Examples
 * 22.4. Examples
 * 22.5. That such sophisms must be solved by distinction of the categories.

Chap. 23. Of the same generally.
 * 23.1. Syllogisms whose fault consists "in dictione" may all be solved by asserting the contrary to what the sophist assumes, and which being affirmed, causes the false syllogism.

Chap. 24. Of Solution of Deceptions from Accident.
 * 24.1. Method of solution, to assert that what is present with the accident need not be with the subject—in other words, to deny the consequence from the accident to the subject. Examples.
 * 24.2. Solution by distinguishing the question. Observation.
 * 24.3. Another erroneous method of solution.
 * 24.4. By duplicity.
 * 24.5. Another method.

Chap. 25. Of Solution of Arguments deduced from what is simply, etc.
 * 25.1. We must compare the opponent's conclusion with our own thesis, in order to ascertain whether a statement can be made, not sinmply, but in a certain respect or relation—a distinction drawn. Cf. ch. 5.
 * 25.2. Examples.

Chap. 26. Of Solution of Arguments from the Definition of Elenchus.
 * 26.1. Rule to be observed in comparing the opponent's conclusion with the thesis; except there is a contradiction, there is no elenchus. Examples.

Chap. 27. Of Solution of Arguments derived from petitio principii.
 * 27.1. How paralogisms must be refuted, in which there is a petitio principii.

Chap. 28. Of Solution of Deceptions from Consequents.
 * 28.1. That there are two modes of right consequence, and two of false consequence.

Chap. 29. Of Solution of Deceptions from Irrelevant Assumption.
 * 29.1. Rule in these paralogisms.

Chap. 30. Of Deceptions which take many Interrogations as one.
 * 30.1. Definition to be employed in these paralogisms at first, and distinctions to be drawn in reply.
 * 30.2. These arguments come under equivocation.

Chap. 31. On the Solution of Paralogisms leading to Repetition.
 * 31.1. We must deny that a word separately signifies the same as when conjoined with another. Cf. ch. 12.

Chap. 32. Of avoiding Solecisms.
 * 32.1. It must be stated in these cases that the opponent not really, but only apparently, concludes a solecism, because we seem to have granted, what we have not granted.

Chap. 33. Of the Methods of detecting the Genus of Arguments.
 * 33.1. The true solution of paralogisms in which there is the same error is in some cases more difficult than in others.
 * 33.2. Those arguments most acute which reduce a person to the greatest doubt.
 * 33.3. Of foolish argument.
 * 33.4. That the querist may argue against the thesis, or against the party defending it, or plead time in excuse.

Chap. 34. Conclusion.
 * 34.1. Summary of the preceding topics.
 * 34.2. Concluding observations upon dialectic.
 * 34.3. Peculiarity of this subject, in that, unlike others, it has received no previous elucidation.
 * 34.4. Appeal to the judgment.

