Oregon Historical Quarterly/Volume 28/England and Oregon Treaty of 1846

The Oregon Treaty of June 15, 1846, extended the boundary between the United States and British America west of the Rocky Mountains along the forty-ninth parallel north latitude to the Pacific Ocean. This treaty was the peaceful climax of a long-standing territorial controversy that at one time threatened seriously to involve the United States and Great Britain in a war. The territory in dispute lay be tween latitude forty-two north and fifty-four north, and between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific Ocean. For thirty years neither nation had been willing to agree to a definite division of territory, and two conventions, in 1818 and in 1827, had resulted in an agreement to joint occupation. By 1846 Great Britain had practically abandoned her claim to the territory between the forty-second parallel and the Columbia River, nor did she, in the course of the negotiations of 1844-46, aggressively assert it. While the United States at all times vigorously asserted her right to the entire territory north to latitude fifty-four forty, she had, by thrice proposing to accept the forty-ninth parallel as a boundary, practically admitted the validity of the English claim north of that line,-the slogan "Fifty-four-forty or fight" to the contrary notwithstanding. The heart of the dispute, then, was the territory between the Columbia River and the forty-ninth parallel.

The treaty of 1846 awarded this entire region to the United States. Certainly the disputed territory was not granted to the United States because she had a superior legal title to it; the English title was not inferior to the American, and in international politics boundaries are the products not of law, but of accommodation. How did the United States manage to secure the region north of the Columbia River? What factor or factors enabled the United States to vindicate her claim by the diplomatic triumph of the Oregon Treaty?

The orthodox answer to this query has perhaps best been voiced by President Harding in his address at Meacham, Oregon: "But stern determination triumphed, and! the result was conclusive. Americans had settled the country. The country belonged to them because they had taken it; and in the end the boundary settlement was made on the line of the forty-ninth parallel, your great Northwest was saved and a veritable empire was merged in the young Republic."'1 This was for popular consumption, but a prominent historian has given it his support. "It was the Oregon pioneer," writes Dr. Schafer, "who, fulfilling by his arduous trail-making across the continent in the forties earlier prophesies of American expansion to the Pacific, vindicated his government's pretensions to the forty-ninth parallel boundary on the ground of contiguity, and actually prepared the triumph technically won by American diplomacy."2 The acquisition of Oregon is viewed as a victory of our diplomats, indeed, but far more as a victory of our settlers. This doctrine, that the acquisition of Oregon was secured, not in Washington, but on the banks of the Columbia, has undeniable appeal and undeniable force. The doctrine that sovereignty follows settlement has force because, especially in the history of this nation, it has generally been true. In the particular history of the Oregon controversy, too, the territory south of the Columbia River was guaranteed, beyond question, to the United States by the American settlements along the Willamette. Both England and the United States recognized the force of this argument from possession: England by virtually abandoning her claim to this region, the United States by basing her claim to sovereignty so largely on possession.3 The only objection to the application of this theory of territorial acquisition by settlement to the Oregon territory, is that, while it is valid for the region south of the Columbia River, it can have no application to the region between the Columbia and the forty-ninth parallel. This territory could not

1 New York Times, July 4, 1923.

2 Schafer, Joseph, Oregon Pioneers and American Diplomacy, in Turner Essays in American History; 55.

3 John Quincy Adams in Congressional Globe, Feb. 9, 1846.

have been secured for the United States by the American settler, for at the time the final negotiations were under taken, there was not an American settler in the entire territory.4 After negotiations were well under way, in 1845, eight Americans from the Willamette region settled in Puget Sound,5 and this colony had acquired no accession by 1846. The American farmer was not intrenched in this No Man's Land of Oregon. On the contrary the region was occupied by the English in a manner scarcely less permanent, or less compelling, and more exclusive, than was the territory to the south by Americans.6 If the American settlement won Oregon south of the Columbia, why did not the English settlements win the territory north of the Columbia ?

It was an interaction of two sets of factors, economic, political, psychological, and personal, that resulted in the accommodation of the Oregon Treaty. That treaty was the product, not of legal principles, nor of local phenomena, but of accommodation, and the problem, despite the camouflage of diplomatic verbiage, was to adjust two sets of com promises. In this accommodation that set of factors which could bring the most immediate and the most compelling pressure to bear upon the principles of the negotiation was the victorious one. For three decades the two nations had been unable to agree on any adjustment. For three decades the United States had insisted on the forty-ninth parallel as the northern boundary of its territory,7 England on the

4 McLoughlin's Last Letter in American Historical Review, XXI, 113 note 11. Bancroft, H. H. History of Washington, Idaho and Montana, ch. 1.

5 Merk, F., Oregon Pioneers and the Boundary, Am. Hist. Rev. XXIX , 683.

6 Merk, op. cit. Dr. Merk shows conclusively that the Hudson's Bay Company and the Puget Sound Agricultural Company were firmly entrenched in the region north of the Columbia River. The author is prepared to go even further in his evaluation of British interests and possessions in this territory. See unpublished thesis in the University of Chicago Library, Some Factors in the Acquisition of Oregon Territory by the United States, ch. 3.

7 "The unswerving tenacity with which every administration insisted on that line constitutes one of the most remarkable chapters in, and one of the most brilliant triumphs of, our diplomacy."? Marshall, E. , Acquisition of Oregon, vol. I, 143.

Columbia River. It was largely due to the peculiar social, economic and political conditions which obtained in England during the last Peel administration, in the United States during the Polk administration, that a settlement of the difficulty was finally effected, and it was due to the peculiar juxtaposition of those mutual factors that the United States was able to dictate a settlement which England had three times uncompromisingly rejected. A product of those conditions was, in England, free trade, in the United States, the Mexican War. The settlement of the Oregon controversy in accordance with the demands of the United States was achieved not by any superiority of the American claim, nor by the special righteousness of the American cause, nor by the irresistible demands of American settlement, but by a combination of temporary, fortuitous, and circumstantial phenomena, extraneous to the local situation, largely out side of American control, and foreign to American influence.

This complex of factors in America is known as the "Roaring Forties," an appellation to which Mr. Minnegerode has added the charming "Fabulous Forties." This American scene has been subjected to intensive study,8 and it is generally believed that out of the travail of this decade came the birth of Oregon. The English scene, if less charming, is more complex, more variegated, more difficult of analysis. But it is probably the more important scene, and we propose that the English situation was the decisive factor in the settlement of the Oregon controversy. Had England been in a position to maintain her rights on the Pacific Coast, had circumstances permitted her to be equally as uncompromising as the United States, the Oregon question might have been subjected to the uncertain arbitrament of war, and in that event it is a matter for conjecture only what would have been its ultimate fate. A combinatlon of circumstances and considerations made the English gov ernment unable and unwilling to resort to this final appeal,

8 Bell, James Christy, Opening a Highway to the Pacific, 1838-1846, N. Y. 1921. See especially ch. 5, Agrarian Discontent in the Mississippi Valley, 1840-45.

and, forced to compromise, it was at a certain disadvantage. The elements which present themselves for analysis of the English scene are those of distance; the situation, relationship and attitude of the Hudson's Bay Company; the English national political situation; the imperial political situation; the economic situation; the tariff; the personnel and character of the Peel cabinet. London was far away from Oregon, and proximity is a very compelling motive. England as a nation was interested in Oregon only incidentally,-it was the Hudson's Bay Company, a business corporation, that was primarily interested, and the Company had already begun to abandon the territory in dispute and did not feel its interests to be violently affected by the transferral of sovereignty. The political situation in England was a critical one, the English government was face to face with problems of national and immediate interest that were of much greater importance than Oregon, and the ministry was twice overthrown during the progress of the Oregon negotiations, though not because of them. Canada had but recently rebelled, and England, properly disappointed in the results of what she considered her enlightened colonial policy, doubted seriously the wisdom of further territorial acquisitions. Economic distress of the most acute nature demanded the undistracted attention of the English government and resulted in the repeal of the Corn Laws and the Poor Laws. The Peel ministry (1842-1846) finally, was pre-eminently a peace ministry, and willing to go to extreme lengths in order to preserve peace.

Buchanan never wrote more truly than his letter to Packenham, 'Neither is the territory in dispute of equal or nearly equal value to the two powers. Whilst it is invaluable to the United States, it is of comparatively small importance to Great Britain. To her Oregon would be but a distant colonial possession of doubtful value, and which, from the natural progress of human events, she would not probably long enough enjoy to derive from it essential benefits, whilst to the United States it would become an integral and essential portion to the Republic. The gain to Great Britain she would never sensibly feel, whilst the loss to the

United States would be irreparable."9 Oregon did not stand in that same sentimental relationship to England that it did to the United States. Not any part of it was home for English emigrants. Nor was there immediate prospect that it would become a colonial possession in the same sense that Canada was. Gallatin expressed it, "For the Americans, Oregon is or will be home; for England, it is but an out post, which may afford means of rather than be a source of real power. In America we all have the same ultimate object in view, we differ only with respect to the means by which it may be attained."'" And again, "it may also be observed that England has heretofore evinced no disposition whatever to colonize the territory in question. She has, in deed, declared most explicitly her determination to protect the British interests that had been created by British enterprise and capital in that quarter. But by giving a monopoly of the fur trade to the Hudson's Bay Company she has virtually arrested private efforts on the part of British subjects. Her government has been in every other respect altogether inactive, and apparently careless about the ultimate fate of Oregon. The country has been open to her enterprise at least fifty years, and there are no other British settlements or interests within its limits than those vested in, or connected with, the Hudson's Bay Company."" Oregon was six thousand miles from England, without direct economic or human profit, and not worth fighting for. This may not have been a rational argument, but it was an effective one.

This argument was reinforced by the status and relationship of the Hudson's Bay Company. That Company held an exclusive monopoly on the entire territory concerned. Its status was semi-official, but it profited England little. The era of great companies and exclusive charters was at an end, and the Hudson's Bay Company was an historical and political anachronism. England had little to lose by transferral of the Oregon territory to the United

9 Buchanan to Packenham, Works of James Buchanan, vol. 6, 372.

10 Gallatin, Oregon Question, 27.

11 Gallatin, Oregon Question, 45.

States. Nor was there general sympathy for the Company. The London Examiner stated editorially, "If the award were to give the whole territory to America, the value of the monopoly enjoyed by the Hudson's Bay Company would be a little diminished. But as that monopoly is injurious to the English people, we should not bitterly grieve at an event which would reduce the value of the Company's stock one per cent." 12

And indeed, the Company itself was not averse to such a settlement as that finally effected. Dr. Merk has discovered what he holds to be the key to the peaceful solution of the Oregon question in the action and attitude of the Company at this time.13 Menaced by the influx of Americans to the territory south of the Columbia River and uncertain of their ability to maintain their monopolistic paradise in face of the land-hungry Yankees, the Hudson's Bay Company had already in 1845 shifted its base from its traditional headquarters on the Columbia to Fort Victoria on Vancouver Island.14 "So quietly was this shift of base made that hardly any American understood at the time what was happening; but it did not escape the notice of Lord Aberdeen. He knew of it in 1845 and welcomed it for the promise it offered of a peaceful solution of the Oregon controversy The Hudson's Bay Company had unwittingly revealed by its move that it no longer regarded the Columbia River as a vital trade route or an indispensable outlet for its western provinces to the sea; that a water course which looked imposing on the maps was of so little real promise for any thing but a fur-trade commerce that it was being relegated by the British interest which best knew its potentialities to secondary uses. To yield this river to the United States

12 London Examiner, April 26, 1845.

13 Merk, F., op. cit. 691 seq.

14 "The Honble. Company as a body looked upon with much jealous rancour and hostility, leading to serious apprehensions in the minds of the Council that the Depot at Fort Vancouver, and the other posts within reach of these people are not safe from plunder. These apprehensions have determined us on giving directions that the.great bulk of the property in depot at (Fort) Vancouver be removed to Fort Victoria, which is intended to be made the principal depot of the Country." Simpson to Hudson's Bay Company, June 20, 1845. Quoted in Merk, op. cit., 69 5.

could not involve serious national loss, nor under the circumstances lay the government open to partisan attack or national outcry. And the surrender of the Columbia was the key to the peaceful solution of the Oregon boundary."' . This shift of base and practical abandonment of the Oregon territory is the explanation of the lackadaisical attitude of the Company toward the controversy which has excited the curiosity and the indignation of historians not a little. A Canadian historian observes, "The action of McLoughlin, the virtual governor of the Northwest, in joining the provisional government fatally compromised the Company and it is by no means a matter for surprise that, after Gordon's report had been received, Lord Aberdeen decided to abandon the British claim to the mainland south of the forty-ninth parallel. If the Hudson's Bay Company was content to accept the existing government-so strongly pro-United States that annexation to, or absorption by, that country was only a question of time,-is it surprising that the British diplomats concluded a treaty that apparently conserved the interests of the Company so far as they themselves, apparently desired them conserved." 16 And Bancroft, plunging in as usual where historians have feared to tread, declares, "As the time drew near when the rights of owner ship and occupation must be finally determined, British statesmen asked themselves, Is the country worth having? Further than this, Is it worth fighting for? These queries they put to the London management of the Hudson's Bay Company and the answers were not satisfactory. The Company cared nothing for the value of the country, cared little whether England should fight for it. Their interest lay in preserving it as a hunting ground. So long as this was done, and they enjoyed a monopoly on the fur-trade, all as well - When McLoughlin was asked this question, he answered plainly that he did not think the country worth

15 Merk, op. cit., 695 -96.

16 White, James, in Canada and Her Provinces, vol. VIII, 869.

fighting for." ' ' 7 And a contemporary English chronicler complains somewhat peevishly, 'Whatever may be the justice of the claim which the Company assert, to the gratitude of the Indian races, and of the settlers in their territories, the United States have, at any rate, a debt which they seem inclined to acknowledge, as long as the payment can be made in nothing more valuable than words. - Had that corporation asserted the privileges of their charter against American claims as vigorously as they have ever opposed them to British liberties, the boundary between the United States and British North America would never have been settled along the 49th parallel. - There are many - who assert that the conduct and policy of the Hudson's Bay Company in the Oregon territory formed the chief part of the title which the United States had to the country which was gratuitously given her by the settlement of the boundary. What the United States owe to the Company for its policy on the west side of the Rocky Mountains, is a question to which the English public will some day demand a satisfactory answer."'18

Not only had England no direct economic interest in the disputed region, she had scarcely a diplomatic or political interest, all the interchange of negotiations to the contrary notwithstanding. England did not, at the time of the controversy, nor has she since, historically, evidenced any particular interest in Oregon. There is absolutely no comparison between the importance of the role which Oregon plays on the American and on the English stage. The in significant position to which the whole affair is relegated today by British historians is in illuminating contrast to the

17 Bancroft, H. H., History of British Columbia, 121. He gives no authority for the statement of McLoughlin's.

18 Fitzgerald, J,. An Examination of the Charter and Proceedings of the Hudson's Bay Company, 12.

importance attached to it by American authorities.19 Oregon does not now, nor did it in 1846, loom up so ominously, so significantly, in English as in American politics. The contrast in the importance attached to the dispute by English and American historians today is paralleled by contemporary evidence. To Americans Oregon was, with Texas, a matter which commanded their most complete attention and fervid enthusiasm; to Englishmen it was a more or less incidental annoyance which threatened to interfere in the fulfillment of economic and social reforms. A comparison of the attention devoted to discussion of the Oregon question in the Congressional Globe and in Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, is suggestive. A similar comparison between the Annual Register and its American counterpart, Niles Register, reveals the same discrepancy. England was other wise interested. The people of England had no direct interest, and therefore no interest. Bryce supports this view, "It must be remembered that the questions which arose be tween the two countries were all, (except the Trent affair) remote from the knowledge and interest of the great bulk of Englishmen, so that it was never worth the while of any politician however free from scruples, to win any popular favor by an anti-American policy."20 And another English historian observes, "Anglo-American relations were of comparatively slight interest to the British public, and American affairs were hardly understood by it. To even the best informed of British ministers the inveterate American suspicion of their motives seemed inexplicable, for they knew that the whole electorate was averse to enlarging British

19 Even the larger histories of modern England dismiss the whole controversy with scant courtesy. In the three-volume edition of the etters of Peel, edited by Parker, there are only four casual references to the whole dispute. Contrast this attitude with that found in Polk's Diary. Thursfield's Life of Peel dismisses the question in one paragraph as a "frontier dispute with the United States." Mariott in his England Since Waterloo, writes, "The years between 1841 and 1846 were not devoid of other interests. Foreign affairs were, throughout the whole period, of secondary importance, but it is important to note.that in 1846, the Ore gon Treaty settled the boundary on the Pacific Coast, giving us undisputed possession of Vancouver Island."

20 Bryce, J ., Introduction to Dunning, W ., British Empire and the United States, xxvii.

public engagements on the Americon continent, and that the tendency of the time was rather to lighten Great Britain's colonial burdens than to add to them.' It had never been to the advantage of the Hudson's Bay Company to advertise the region. Oregon had never brought England any direct profit. "In the final analysis," says a Canadian writer, "a lack of knowledge of the value of Oregon, by inducing a perfectly natural but by no means logical apathy as to its political future, was probably the cause of the loss. For lack of knowledge there was abundant excuse. The whole of the western continent which she held, disputed and undisputed alike, was in the grasp of men whose guiding purpose was to perpetuate the mystery in which the land had been wrapped from the beginning."22

But England was not only ignorant of the value of the country, she was positively misinformed. She had come to consider the region valueless except for fur. Dunn, an English observer, wrote that the only habitable portion of the whole territory was the southern portion of Vancouver Island. 23 And a writer in the Edinburgh Review of July, 1845, solemnly warned that "It seems probable - that in a few years all that formerly gave life to the country, both the hunter and his prey, will become extinct; and that their places will be supplied by a thin white and half-breed population, scattered along a few fertile valleys, supported by the pasture instead of by the chase, and gradually degenerating into that barbarian far more offensive than that of the savage, which degrades the backwoodsman." 24 And later, urging that the forty-ninth parallel be accepted as the boundary line, "This would give us the whole of Vancouver Island, which, if we are absurd enough to plant a colony in the Northern Pacific, is the least objectionable seat. It possesses excellent parts, a tolerable climate, and some cultivatible soil,-and a command of the important straits, by which to the east and to the south it is separated from the

21 Newton, A. P ., Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, vol. II, 253.

22 Coats, R. H., a nd Gosnell, R. E., Sir James Douglas, 169.

23 Dunn, J., The Oregon Territory, 242.

24 Edinburgh Review, LXXXII, 248.

continent. That its distance from Europe would render it a costly, unprofitable, incumbrance is true; but that objection applies with equal force to every part of Oregon."25

England sent two official expeditions into the territory: the Warre and Vavasour secret mission,26 and the expedition of Gordon and Peel. The Warre and Vavasour expedition was a military reconnaisance of the country, but the report spoke favorably of the economic advantages of the region: its harbours, fishing, mines, grazing, and farm lands. The Gordon expedition published no official report, but we may believe that the unofficial report was of some influence, for Captain Gordon was the brother of Lord Aberdeen and Lieutenant Peel the nephew of Sir Robert Peel. The territory evidently did not impress these officers of the Pacific squadron with its value. Miss Laut says that they declared the whole region worthless, and American settlement negligible, but unfortunately she gives no authority for her assertion, and we may doubt its entire validity, as we may that jolly hunting story wherein Captain Gordon is supposed to exclaim, "I would not give one of the bleakest knolls of all the bleak hills of Scotland for twenty islands arrayed like this in barbaric glories."27 A true Scotsman!

"The great error of all parties," wrote our dyspeptic friend of the Edinburgh Review, "is the importance attached to Oregon - It is much that the real worthlessness of the country has been established. All that any prudent Englishman or American can wish, is that the controversy should be speedily and harmoniously settled."28 This was indeed the desire of Englishmen, but we may doubt that the United States was at one with England in this desire. The conventions of 1818 and 1828 had both tended to compromise England in her stand. The United States could far better afford to wait than could Great Britain. It

25 ibid., 265. 26 The Documents are edited by J. Schafer in the Oregon Historical Quarterly, X, 1 -99.

27 Laut, Agnes, Conquest of the Northwest, vol. 2, 371-2. Bancroft also gives currency to this story, but gives no authority.

28 Edinburgh Review, July, 1845, vol. LXXXII , 261.

is worthy of note that while the United States claimed undisputed title to the whole of Oregon, Great Britain claimed merely a title equal to that of any other nation. The English recognized the disadvantage of this disability. The London Times commented editorially, "If any blame can be attached to the past negotiations on the subject in 1818 and 1827, it is that the English ministers have not insisted enough on the extent and integrity of our rights and that the Americans have been allowed to convert the very slight doubt they endeavored to throw over a part of the case into an admitted right of joint ocupation. It is too late now to put our case so high as it originally stood, and still stands, on its merits. We have acknowledged the principle of joint occupation, with a view to the ultimate partition of the land, and we must abide by it."29 Canning, in a letter to Liverpool, July, 1826, deplored the blunder of "the restoration of Astoria. If we maintain our present ground immovably, we can retrieve it. If we retreat from that, the cession of Astoria will have been but the first symptom of weakness, the first of a series of compliances with encroachments which, if not resisted, will grow upon success. The ambitious and overbearing views of the States are becoming daily more developed and better understood in their country."30 And in 1827 Gallatin wrote to Clay, "National pride prevents any abrupt relinquishment of her (England's) pretensions; but Gt. Brit. does not seem indisposed to let the country gradually and silently slide into the hands of the United States; and she is anxious that it should not in any case become the cause of a rupture between the powers."31 The Peel administration represented this attitude. In a letter to Packenham, March 4, 1844, Aberdeen proposed exactly the boundary settlement which was made in 1846. He wrote, "Should my apprehensions be verified you will endeavor without committing yourself or your country to draw from the American negotiators a proposal to make the forty-ninth degree of latitude the bound

29 London Times, March 1, 1845.

30 Quoted by Schafer, J., in American Historical Review, vol. XVI, 292.

31 Gallatin to Clay, Foreign Relations, 1827, 680.

ary -- 32 This concession represented Aberdeen's private view, and the view of the Peel ministry, and was not representative of the party or popular view. Schafer comments, "We shall not be far wrong in inferring, from the above letter, that by this time the question before the British cabinet was how to convince parliament and the nation that the abandonment of the Columbia River boundary was a political necessity unless Great Britain was ready to accept the stern arbitration of war."33

England was not interested, England was misinformed, the Peel cabinet was compromised by the blunders of its predecessors, and, finally, the cabinet was fully engaged in solving the acute problems of national and imperial politics which confronted it at this time.

"Never before," writes Walpole, "had British minister a more serious task before him. Abroad the heavens were black with clouds. The East - was still ruffled by action; France had neither forgotten nor forgiven the policy of 1840; Canada was still brooding over her wrongs; the United States were preparing for war; China was actually struggling with the British Empire, and disaster was already prepared for British arms in Afghanistan. At home the prolonged depression of trade had produced severe distress; distress, in its aurn, had led to riot, and the ministry had to deal with two formidable organizations, one prepared by the working classes to secure their own political supremacy, the other inspired by the manufacturing classes to promote free trade in corn. The people, moreover, were demanding the immediate repeal of the new Poor Laws. An increasing expenditure and contracted revenue were perplexing statesmen - Every difficulty which could embarrass a statesman stood in the way of Peel and his new colleagues."34 Dunning remarks of this period, "In the early forties recurring distress and agitation among the working classes gave abundant warning to the leading statesmen

32 Quoted by Schafer, J., op. cit., 296.

33. Ibid., 297.

34 Walpole, S., History of England from the Conclusion of the Great War of 1815, vol. IV, 116.

that so grave an economic disturbance as would be involved in a war with the United States was not to be risked so long as any way of escape was open."35

Just at the time of Polk's message of 1845, there were developments in the British cabinet of a most critical nature. Peel was forced to resign, December 11, and Lord John Russell attempted to form a new cabinet, without success. Peel was called back to take up anew the policies which he had inaugurated, but his position was highly precarious, and he knew that he could not maintain himself long in office. "Peel knew that he could not retain office after the repeal of the Corn Laws, and it was the part of great statesmanship not to leave to his successors in office an impasse that had been brought about during his administration. Peel could not go into opposition with a war of his own making on his hands. He would not aggravate the warlike feelings of England for the purpose of maintaining his hold upon office."36

Nor was the imperial situation encouraging. India was in revolt, Ireland in acute distress, Canada had scarcely re covered from the rebellion of 1837. The Canadian Rebellion had a peculiar significance for the Oregon controversy, for it tended to discourage further colonial expansion in North America. Dr. Tolmie, long influential in the councils of the Hudson's Bay Company, wrote, "It must be remembered that between 1834 and 1845 the United Kingdom had, be sides several fighting and other troubles in various parts of the world, great embarrassment in regard to Canada, during 1837-38 in a state of open rebellion. What seems more natural in such a case than that apathy as to future acquisitions of territory in North America should have prevailed in the British councils? From this languid let-aloneness,-not masterly inactivity-the government was probably aroused by the incessant, and not unnatural nudging of the Hudson's Bay Company, and by Polk's loud cry of 'fifty-four forty or fight,' at the time so captivating to the

35 Dunning, op. cit., 264.

36 Reeves, J. S ., American Diplomacy Under Tyler and Polk, 264.

unreflecting of your people."37 And Professor Meany, commenting on this, says, "Here we have the real reason why the United States was permitted to win the great diplomatic victory of 1846." It was not the "real" reason, but it was a reason.

In reference to the Northeastern boundary dispute of 1842, wherein much the same principles were involved, the Quebec Gazette had said, "England would rather relinquish a portion of her rights than proceed to hostilities." And an Halifax journal added, "From all we can learn of the value of the disputed territory, apart from other considerations, we think this would be the more judicious course; as a war with the United States, let it terminate as it would, could not but be attended with the most disastrous consequences."38 And of the Oregon dispute, the Toronto Globe warned Peel, "This is not an age when loyalty goes by blind superstition; it is guided by discrimination. Nations are not to be ruled with a rod of iron,-but swayed by a wise and liberal policy. Let the home government reflect on the position of Canada, should a war unhappily arise be tween Britain and the United States. Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward's Island, and all other North American provinces would have more or less to say to Sir Robert Peel before he goes to war with the United States. Scotland and Wales, as well as Ireland, have a word in his ears, and France, Russia, and Austria will talk to him after war is declared."39 And a similar protest came from suffering Ireland. Neither Ireland nor Canada - have just cause to object to the American occupation, as their interest is even favorable to it - we do trust that Sir Robert Peel will reconsider his unjust and imprudent declaration or that some wiser councillor will save the monarch from asserting by arms a claim so ill-founded at a time so inopportune."40

The economic conditions in England and Ireland were more distressing, far more productive of misery and actual

37 Quoted in Meany, E. S ., First American Setlement in Puget Sound, in Washington Historical Quarterly, vol. VII, 141.

38 Quoted in Niles Register, vol. 58, 69.

39 Toronto Globe, 1845. Quoted in Niles Register, 68, 184.

40 Dublin Nation, 1845. Quoted in Niles Register, vol. 68, 184.

want, than those in the Mississippi Valley. The Poor Laws, the Corn Laws, and financial reform, demanded the undistracted attention of the Peel ministry. Foreign affairs were of distinctly secondary importance. A war with the United States at this time would have been for England an economic and industrial and social calamity.4' England was less independent of the United States than the United States was of England,-even than was the seaboard south of England. England was at a decided military disadvantage, and it would have been the most unpardonable folly to invite a war with a great power. This America knew and took advantage of. An editorial in Niles Register observed, "The question is, will the British government incur a war with the United States for the sake of the sterile region, so remote and useless to them? Will she incur the continuance of the present semi-hostile relation with the United States for the sake of that strip of addition to her immense tracts of useless national domain Will she compromise the immense interests of her manufactures, the pecuniary capabilities of her principal customer, and endanger the supply of raw material for the cotton machinery? Will she forego the advantages which she is now promising herself from the opening of her ports, and thus: shut out supplies of breadstuffs and provisions required by her suffering people ?"142

One of the planks of the Democratic platform of 1844 had called for a reduction of the tariff, and Polk fulfilled this party pledge by the tariff of July, 1846. The passage of this tariff was the occasion of widespread interest in the United States and England. Though accompanied by general agitation, it was not unpopular in this country. To England it was especially welcome at this time of the be

41 "In the history of mankind it would be impossible to point out a nation more anxious than the English are at the present time to remain at peace, and more especially with America." London Sun, March 4, 1846. Another paper remarked: "All balancing, how ever, of the positive advantages to be obtained by one nation or by the other on a partition, is mere childishness. The interruption of confidence for a single week costs more than the whole country is worth." London Examiner, April 26, 1845.

42 NUes Register, May 2, 1846.

ginning of free trade, and of the Irish famine. A certain entente was effected between the free-trade interests in Great Britain and those in the United States; both interests demanded peace, but it was the British that was bargaining. A recent student of the economic situation remarks, "The bad weather continued; and in July, when the Oregon negotiations were resumed at Washington, it grew worse, and began 'the raining away of the Corn Laws,' strengthening the hand of Polk and weakening that of Peel. Not only were the British grain crops ruined; those of the potatoes were also; and the government was in great distress. No one could have been, or was, more keenly alive to the peculiar diplomatic situation than was Lord Aberdeen. Great Britain was becoming obviously dependent upon the United States for supplies of food; but with this disadvantage came a compensation. The American grain crops were unusually good, and the American desire for free admission to the British markets during a period of high prices could be counted as a diplomatic asset by Lord Aberdeen. By skillful manipulation the Americans might be brought to lower their own tariffs and to compromise on the Oregon question."43

The New York Journal of Commerce stated "on authority" that, "It is a fixed fact that an agreement has been entered into settling the Oregon question on the 49th parallel - after this government shall become obligated by law to levy no duties above twenty per cent on British manufactures except coal and iron."44 As a matter of fact the duty on iron was reduced from about eighty to about thirty per cent, the duty on coal from sixty-nine to thirty per cent. On the influence of this reduction on the Oregon controversy, Niles Register commented, "But the great qualifying consideration wherewith to quiet and reconcile British statesmen and the British press to President Polk and his annual message, was the strong hope which the President holds out of a repeal of the tariff of 1842; a consideration

43 Martin, T. P., New Alignments in Anglo-American Politics, 1842-43, in Louisville Courier Journal, April 19, 1923.

44 Niles Register, vol. 69, 384.

to British interests so completely outweighing Oregon that they would be dull indeed of comprehension - if they failed to appreciate the difference. Hence the subdued tone which is observable in almost every English journal, in relation to the dispute with America. To lose an opportunity of accomplishing an object of such vital importance as the repeal of the American tariff, would be madness indeed. All English interests at once unite on that point. So favor able an opportunity must not be thrown away, for a punctilio, or a barren waste of Northwestern wilderness."45

Finally we must remark the profound influence of the character of Peel and of his foreign minister Aberdeen on the course of the negotiations and their final soluton. Sir Robert Peel was eminently a peace minister, and his cabinet a peace cabinet. He came into office with the Conservatives, in 1841. Of this ministry Egerton writes, "So far as foreign policy was concerned, the change was one from tumult to peace - Sir Robert Peel and his foreign secretary, Lord Aberdeen, were both eminently men of peace; the only danger being in the case of the latter, that the bow may have been bent too far the other way - But for the, years 1841-46 never was there a minister of foreign affairs who had such an easy time of it - Lord Aberdeen's weakness was that, himself peace loving, he had a touching confidence in the faith of others."46 In a report on the Oregon question, April 4, 1845, Aberdeen substantiates this characterization, "I believe I may conscientiously say that no man ever filled the high situation which I have the honourunworthily to hold, who felt more ardently desirous than I do to preserve to the country the blessings of peace, or would be disposed to make greater sacrifices, consistent with pro

45 Niles Register, vol. 69, 340.

46 Egerton, H. E., British Foreign Policy in Europe, 197. Of the Maine boundary dispute, Aberdeen had written, "I am sanguine in believing that we shall succeed in preventing a war for a cause so preposterous and absurd as the possession of a few miles of pine swamps." Aberdeen to Mr. Gurney, Feb. 20, 1842 , quoted in Lady Frances Balfour, Life of George Fourth Earl of Aberdeen, vol. 2, 137.

priety, to maintain it. My Lords, I consider war to be the greatest folly, if not the greatest crime, of which a country could be guilty."47

Peel himself was too astute, Aberdeen too cautious, to undertake a war with the United States. Peel was one of the most remarkable, one of the most able, one of the most admirable statesmen of the nineteenth century. Inflexible in the accomplishment of his major ambitions, he was pliant and opportunistic in matters of lesser importance. He had a certain splendid consistency of principle, but not that "foolish consistency" which is the "hobgoblin of little minds." He was a politician of extraordinary cleverness, a party leader of really exceptional ability, at once a politician and a statesman. In some respects not unlike the American President, he was nevertheless motivated by a broad-mindedness, an international-mindedness, that was foreign to the genius of Polk. Though Peel did not fancy the bluster of Polk's inaugural, he was not to be driven by any proud resentment into a position of danger. His was a broad and noble nature; he had something of that innate fineness which actuated Wilson's "Too Proud to Fight."' Nor is it to the credit of the United States that, in these Roaring Forties we were not too proud to fight-either Mexico or England. The Peel ministry, at all events, would not be instrumental in precipitating a bloody war over a region comparatively unknown, apparently worthless. Reeves puts it well, "But was Polk's firmness the cause of the peaceful and fair settlement? Had Palmerston been in Aberdeen's position at the time of Polk's 'firm' pronounce ment, Polk might have lost Oregon. That the Oregon ques tion was settled in the manner it was is one of the glories of the administration of Sir Robert Peel. Aberdeen's large mindedness and consistent belief that the friendship of the United States was worth more to Great Britain than a few degrees of latitude on the Pacific Coast are responsible for the settlement that Polk thought to gain by a firm policy.

47 Hansard,s Parliamentary Debates, April 4, 1845.

That Aberdeen was 'bluffed' by Polk is absurd."48 Aberdeen was not bluffed, but undoubtedly the Peel ministry was somewhat intimidated by the combination of threatening circumstances. Peel would not go to war, Polk, apparently, would.49

48 Reeves, op. cit., 263.

49 There is some truth in the statement of Fish that "Whenever we have encountered England, we have been obliged to compromise, but bluff on our part has often hastened agreement."?American Diplomacy, 271.