One Common Trench or Two Opposite Sides?/Part 5

Where lies our greatest victory?

In the discussions of the Higher Committee for Northern Affairs attended by some leading comrades, during which a review of the combat operations took place, we asked: "Where lies our greatest victory up to the present?" Some said that the greatest victory was the crossing of the Ali Beig Pass1 in keeping with the well-known plan. But we disagreed. The greatest victory was that, up to the present, no soldier had fired at any individual from the opposite trench when the latter had exhausted his ammunition and raised his rifle in capitulation. The greatest victory was that not one woman had been raped during the fighting. There was no repetition of the past plunders. Despite the bloodshed, the surrendering soldiers were invited to eat from the same dish as the victors, as if nothing had happened.

This is the real victory. The unity of Iraq is still strong in the hearts of the Kurds fighting in the opposite trenches, as well as in the hearts of the Kurds and Arabs fighting in the armed forces. So long as the mentality and psychology of unity prevail, this is the greatest victory. Saying this, I know that nothing has happened which contradicts my statement, with the exception of two incidents, neither, of which was the fault of the armed forces. The first took place in Zakho2 the other in Belinkian Basin3. At the time we took those responsible severely to task and established strict rules as well as a detailed report endorsed by the leadership outlining a full explanation of our activities. I will tell you quite frankly that I did not imagine that these ethical and principled rules would be implemented as they were during the fight. I personally allowed for some differences between the report contents and their actual implementation, but, in effect, the report was fully implemented with respect to its principles and ethical grounds.

After March 6, 1975, however, some of our forces grew self-righteous and acted in violation of their orders. We had always told them not to act like victors, since we had not won a military battle with a foreign country.

All our people had triumphed, even those who had fought in the opposite trench. This is the spirit with which we should approach our people. But was this spirit actually put into effect, in keeping with the orders issued after March 1975? The answer is no. Some people became over-confident and were guilty of errors and excesses. In the context of this major achievement, for the sake of history we must ask ourselves: From a scientific point of view, taking into consideration all the prevailing circumstances, are the errors which took place natural ones? There was fighting and heavy casualties. The whole Revolution was endangered by the possibility of an enemy victory. The historical potential of the ABSP was given a major test. In the context of all these circumstances, the excesses, which took place, were not entirely exceptional. We do not want to justify them, of course. We have already criticised them severely, and continue to do so since 1975. We have issued guidelines and punished the offenders. In order to speak objectively, one must remember the past 14 years of fighting and the 14 thousand dead and injured among the armed forces and patriotic detachments within one year, in addition to the heavy casualties suffered by our people as well. Although I have no statistics on the latter, I repeat: In view of the political context, the major embarrassment and danger, which we feared, was a reaction against the March and against Autonomy itself. People would say to each other: “In the case of victory, we should not react passively but continue to approach this question as we did in the past. We should not assume that the manifesto was signed with Mullah, and since he abandoned it we should do the same.” No, this is not just a commitment of the Mullah; it is our own commitment, the commitment of the leadership, the patriotic forces, and the ABSP. Mullah Mustapha was only a circumstantial actor in the question of signing the Match Manifesto document, whose essence is autonomy. He never actually believed in autonomy. The Kurdish brothers are well aware of this. Nor did he believe in the state, authority, secession, or unity, but rather in an abnormal situation through which he could consolidate his political position. The only element of leadership he ever possessed was a rifle. Hence, the only thing he wished for was a rifle.

This is the first time I have said this. Not even at the leadership meetings have I said that, given these circumstances, the errors, which occurred, seem natural to me. Since we in the leadership are very sensitive to errors, the members of the leadership, present in this hall, are aware that I am saying this for the first time. We sharply reprimand the advanced cadres, taking them to task for the smallest error. But since we wish to evaluate the recent past of this question—in order to set things straight rather than just to punish the guilty—we see this as a routine procedure.

We are not allowing such errors to recur, but rather placing them within the scope of a general objective historical evaluation.

1 - Au Beig Pass is considered to be one of the most strategic natural barriers, not only in Iraq, but also in the entire world. This pass has witnessed many fierce battles. The liberation of the pass by the Iraqi army led to the defeat of the renegade faction.

2 - Zakho is located in Dohuk Governorate, near the Iraqi-Turkish border.

3 - Belinkian Basin was a center of the renegade faction, which witnessed fierce fighting.