One Common Trench or Two Opposite Sides?/Part 3

Requirements for victory

Comrades:

Militants should be vigilant and cautious, without being vain. The comrades assembled here have already heard me in the past speak about confidence in the future at a time when the rebellion in the mountains was strong and the reactionary forces in the area were preparing their antagonistic schemes from stronger positions. Still, we were confident in victory. Perhaps some of you said to yourselves then that, “Comrade Saddam is too conceited.” But this self-confidence was based on deep faith in the people as well as careful scientific revolutionary calculations. On the basis of these calculations we were able to tell people whether we would win or lose.

Some of the Communist comrades must have said to themselves:

“Those petit bourgeois are incapable of victory because the basic conditions for a revolutionary party, a patty that aims at building a socialist community, are not fully present. How can they overcome the forces of counterrevolution? They must therefore be self-righteous.”1

We could have excused such conceptions as a result of the negative relations, which existed in the first two years of the Revolution, but since that time there have been no objective justifications or explanations for such attitudes.

I am not asking for praise from anyone. I assure you, comrades, that when topics are presented for discussion between two separate trenches, we have full confidence that we are the ones to praise others. However, we are presenting this formula now from one interacting trench in which we, together, praise others outside the PPNF.

The victory, which we have achieved, was not a victory for Baathists alone, but for all of us, as a people and as a Front. It is in this spirit that we have triumphed.

It is in this same manner, and not with a self-righteous attitude, that we should approach the minor incidents, which sometimes occur in the Autonomous Area. In other words, we must understand the development of the historical movement and of the people’s will, the will, which we are resolutely leading, with full intention of achieving our aim of building a new society. We stress again that these trivial incidents will not frighten us nor can they do anything to stop the march of the Revolution.

We must, above all, look for defects within ourselves. If we were to lose our people in Kurdistan, we would suffer a real loss. But ten, a hundred or any number of people in the high mountains standing against the Revolution is of no importance. There have been large numbers of deceived people in the high mountains before, together with traitors and conspirators, but they were unable to stop the march of the Revolution. If we were, however, to lose our people in the Kurdistan Autonomous Area, even if there were not a single armed opponent in the mountains or along the borders, we would be defeated. When we win our people over, we shall be victorious. The future will be open and clear before us, whether the insurgents number ten, a hundred or a thousand. Our victory is certain; in fact, we are already victorious.

We have stated earlier that, prior to March 11, 1970, if the Kurdish question had been dealt with through a purely military approach, we would have been the losers, even if the last trench of the enemy forces in the mountains had been defeated. But if the question were approached in a correctly principled and political manner, we would win the battle even if our enemies were numerous. This prediction has been justified in the defeat of a renegade faction, which involved more than a purely military solution. The Iraqi army, despite its valiant role, would not have been able to perform effectively if it had not been defending the political principles and aims drawn up by the political leadership.

Principles were responsible for the defeat of Mullah Barazani and his renegade faction. The basis of these principles is a common approach to the problems of all our people, whether in Kurdistan or in Basrah, as well as to our own problems.

When this approach is ignored, the hundred opponents will become a thousand, the thousand will become five thousand and there, then, ten thousand. In fact, even if there were no armed rebellion at all, you, yourselves, would be defeated.

We are not saying this for propaganda purpose, but because we really believe in it. We made the same statement after the agreement of March 6, 19752 immediately following the defeat of the renegade faction in the mountains. We stated then: “Do not be self-righteous, for then you will get carried away and lose your capacity for perceiving the right direction and objectives. Do not ignore the factors which contributed to your victory, but rather develop them further in order to be always victorious...”

The essence of these factors is concern for your people. We like the mountain in the northern part of the country not merely because it is part of Iraq, but primarily because our people live there. We defend the mountain in order to defend our people and this is the way we must approach the issue. Those who defend the mountain but oppress their people cannot be victorious. While defending the mountain, it should be made clear that you are essentially defending the people who live there.

1 - Comrade Saddam Hussein is referring to the erroneous analyses committed by some Communists when they classify the ABSP as a petit bourgeois party, neglecting its real characteristics as a revolutionary vanguard party representing all revolutionary social strata.

2 - The March 6, 1975 Agreement was signed between Iraq and Iran to solve the border problems between the two countries. The agreement was concluded in Algiers during the open summit conference. It was signed by Comrade Saddam Hussein, on behalf of Iraq, and by the Shah of Iran on behalf of his country. President Houari Boumedienne participated in the meetings concerning this agreement, which established the basis for the respect of sovereignty and friendly relations between the two countries.