One Common Trench or Two Opposite Sides?/Part 1

Foreword

The question of the National Front has been a pivotal one in the Iraqi revolutionary experiment since July 17-30, 1968. The Arab Baath Socialist Party, which leads this experiment, views the Front as a strategically program with long-term aims, not only for the revolutionary experiment in the country itself, but also for the Arab revolutionary movement.

This profound principle needs constant emphasis and explanation, especially in the light of various problems in the process of revolutionary transformation, which the Front has faced in the course of the experiment's practical implementation.

One of the outstanding characteristics of the revolutionary experiment in Iraq is that the problems arising during the experiment are neither neglected nor covered up, but discussed openly in a democratic and objective spirit.

This distinctive approach stands out clearly in the following address by Comrade Saddam Hussein.

Delivered at an enlarged meeting of the Committees of the Progressive Patriotic and Nationalist Front, the address deals very frankly with problems, which arise, in practice. The solutions suggested by Comrade Saddam Hussein stem from faith in the necessity of the Front and its continuation for the accomplishment of the program of the revolution in all fields, including the program of socialist transformation.

This meeting took place on August 21, 1976, in Baghdad. It was chaired by Comrade Saddam Hussein and attended by members of the PPNF Higher committee, Secretariat and committees from the governorates.

This address constitutes an important account of the achievements and problems of the revolutionary experiment conducted in Iraq by the Arab Baath Socialist Party. Due to the advanced and authentically revolutionary methods of action adopted by the leaders of this endeavor, the experiment has become a genuine center of diffusion for the Arab Revolution as a whole.

The subjective defect

Let us begin with the subjective defect. Regardless of what we say concerning the external forces conspiring directly against our revolution and, more generally, against the Arab people and the peoples of the area, our main protection remain subjective immunity.

No matter how careful we are in assessing the dangers, unless we are subjectively immune we can contribute nothing serious and decisive to the full safety of the revolution, nor can we place the PPNF in its appropriate place where it is free from all external and internal dangers.

Several comrades spoke at this meeting. Most of them, however, were from the Baath Party and Communist Party, in addition to a few representing the other patriotic forces and elements. In spite of its wholesome and democratic aspects, this phenomenon accounts for parts of the conflict going on between the two parties outside the framework of the Front and which has also come to express itself as an intra-Front conflict. Thus, we have seen the Baathists criticizing the Communists directly or indirectly for their acts. The Communists, on their part, have done the same. This criticism, however, has not been accompanied by self-criticism, which, in my opinion, is the key factor. When we find a solution to this aberration, which becomes more serious with the growing dangers surrounding us and the social advance of the Revolution toward its aims, we shall have placed ourselves in the correct position.

Independence and inter-action

I think that the error found among Baathists, and particularly among Communists (we should state this boldly and frankly, especially since the Communists’ error in this case outweighs that of the Baathists; I do not say this because I am a Baathist but because I am firmly convinced of it.) occurs when an individual comrade, from his own ideological perspective, believes that he alone can bring about the full and absolute truth in practice. He then insists on this conviction, asking others to follow him. All his subsequent actions, then, will be affected by this position. Such an incorrect notion of independence, if it continues, does nothing to aid the Front in reaching its strategic horizon.

I say this with full responsibility and concern for all patriotic tendencies. The basis for interaction, comrades, is the presence of a spirit and a desire for interaction. Desire alone, however, without a firm base, is insufficient. Hence we should create the psychological atmosphere, which makes interaction a necessary and essential process. In any case, interaction is not incompatible with ideological independence.

A member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) would not have joined his party without first being convinced in the truth of its endeavor. The same can be said about Baathists and Communists. But now we are called upon to proceed on the basis of facts which lead us to interaction and which place new facts before us. Predominant among these is the recognition of the Revolution as our major truth, which does not preclude our principle independence but functions rather as a roof under which we conduct our debates in a non-antagonistic way. Also, our relationships to the Revolution, as well as to each other, should be characterised by an interaction of ideas. Secondly, ideological independence does not preclude interaction whose purpose is to place ideology in a new context whose new aspects will be the adaptation to and interaction with the facts and developing objective conditions of the society which will open new paths for political, ideological and social action. Such an orientation will enable us to form a Front with plenty of common ground, always improving the interactions of our convictions.

Every one of us should be both a teacher and a student in his relationship with the people and the contingents of the patriotic and progressive forces. This would create a process of give and take, of interaction for the purpose of arriving at a truth. Also, this would create an image of serious work and sincere relations for the purpose of achieving, together, some common aims.

This form of interaction, which we want in our relationship within the Front, will safeguard and develop our common purpose.

We all agree that theory is formulated and developed in the light of reality. Why, then, should some of you only wish to be teachers, without agreeing to interact with the others? We should each simultaneously practice the roles of student and teacher.

Without this key quality, interaction cannot exist, nor can there be an end to the occasional tension on the part of the Baathists, nor can there be an end to the tension and incorrect actions on the part of the Communists (which also feed the attitude of the Baathists and provide them with psychological justifications). This is also true of the other patriotic contingents.

For example, even in the ABSP, when we criticize the party organization in Lebanon and the struggle for power in that Arab province, some Baathists are sensitive to criticism on the part of those who have not participated seriously in the construction process or shown definite concern for the Revolution and its future. We have already experienced such cases.

Rights and duties, then, should be balanced. Any comrade who wishes to have the right to criticize should give proof of his concern in the criticism process through a distinguished performance of his every-day work. Otherwise, he would not deserve such a privilege and would face opposition from other comrades.

Side by side with an ideological independence interacting with new facts, there should be a clear affinity to the revolution. This affinity to the Revolution, however, should not preclude ideological independence, but, so long as the affinity of some among you to the Revolution is not clearly established, Baathists are bound to harbor some reservation toward them.

Communist comrades, there have been many experiments in the world where Communist parties have acted with great flexibility in response to the national situations in their respective countries. In Cuba, for example, the Communist Party cooperated with Castro’s revolution to the point where Castro became the leader of the Communist Party there. There are Communist Parties in Eastern Europe, which do not even bear the name of the Communist Party. Why should ideological independence in this country be interpreted in a manner, which obstructs cooperation between yourselves and your comrades in other political tendencies, when it is interpreted differently in other revolutionary experiments throughout the world?

We sometimes hear a lot of talk from Baathist and other political groups in the Front. Some Baathist comrades consider they are lost in the Front and some discuss this subject in their Party locals. They ask their leaders to answer the following questions:

Why do we need the Front at a time when the main positive aspects of the Communist Party are simply its support for our revolutionary measures? measures on which the entire population agree with us, such as nationalization of the oil industry, the giant strides along the path toward socialism, the defense of Iraq’s future against the suspicions reactionary offensive spearheaded by the renegade faction in the north... etc? Could the Communist Party take any stand other than this if it were outside the front? Is the fact that the Communist Party supports us in such cases sufficient proof of its cooperation with the Revolution, whereas it turns against us whenever it finds us to be in error? (When we say that the Communist Party turns against us, we do not mean that it preaches slogans to overturn our regime, since we know there is no justification for such slogans. We mean, rather, that in its educational position and every-day activities, it turns against us. By this method it tries to make gains at the expense of the other patriotic groups, most frequently the Arab Baath Socialist Party.) The same holds for our Communist comrades, who also discuss these questions in their meetings, asking: Why do we need the Front if we do not really share power? It also holds, albeit to a lesser extent, for our comrades in the other patriotic political groups. We, then, ask the following question: Are not the joint efforts to build a new society with greater zeal, which reinforce Baathist efforts with those of the KDP, the independents, the Communist Party, the KDP and the Progressive Kurds already enough of an advantage for the ABSP? The answer is yes.

An objective and all-embracing outlook, an outlook of interaction and serious joint efforts to build a new society devoid of syndicalist concepts of gain, such an outlook would be to the advantage of the ABSP and all other parties.

We also ask the following question: What has the ABSP lost by forming a front? Should the individuals gained by the Communist Party be regarded as a loss to the Baath Party according to the previously mentioned Front outlook?

With such a concept guiding the Front and its everyday activity, however, everyone wins and no one loses. The same question is addressed to the Communist Party: Comrades, you are thinking of your own interests, but what have you lost? You have grown in number and popularity. Your organization has grown stronger. Today, you are free to exchange ideas with other patriotic groups and you are acting freely. What would you have gained if you had remained outside the Front?

According to our information, some brothers, especially from the Communist Party, still feel embarrassed when asked: Are you with the regime or not? Are you with the Revolution or not? Is it embarrassing for one to side with the great Revolution and its regime? The Revolution is cherished by every honest patriot and its major achievements are obvious to all. If there is to be any speculation about whether one is for or against the Revolution, it should be made in the context of goals, not that of details which should be criticized in a democratic and objective manner.

We should all criticize flawed details, but errors in details should not bring us into a psychological opposition to the Revolution and its regime. At the same time, however, the errors of the administrative apparatus should be neither a means nor a justification for pursuing Party interests. The basic justification for these should be our ideology as we expound it in cooperation with the masses.

The Communists believe in a line ideologically different from that of the Baath Party. The same is true of the KDP and the others. They believe in pursuing their interests independently, since any other way would be hound to lead to contradictions among the various patriotic forces. It might even lead to deviation if it came into contact with the revolutionary process. Suppose we Baathists reversed the case and started attacking the Communists in our speeches and through our media, saying that they were attacking our regime and principles. They would regard these as improper uses of the administrative apparatus and would try to put these tactics to their own advantage. What do you imagine would happen? Is such a state of affairs acceptable? If it is, you can imagine how much you would lose if the leaders of the Baath Party were to inform the masses of the negative aspects of the Communist Party. We say this not out of vanity, but rather out of the conviction that our relationship with the masses is based on positive cooperation and mutual trust. That is why they would listen to our words. So when, instead of saying that, we speak positively of the Front, of your role in it, and of the role of the other patriotic forces, this is to your advantage.

Therefore, since there is no loss within the Front for any group, why are there such reservations? Why have the negative vestiges of the past survived until now? Even now we still notice these vestiges of the past, with their negative aspects, among the Communists and Baathists.

Both parties, however, did not regard these vestiges as deviations deserving strict and stern criticism.

The comrade to whom you have referred as refusing to deliver a speech on behalf of the Front should have been taken severely to task. Similarly, any Baathist who violates the central directives should he called to account for his actions.

(1) Comrade Saddam Hussein is referring to a problem dealt with at the meeting, namely, the refusal of a Communist comrade to deliver a speech on behalf of the Front at a public meeting.