North Carolina v. Alford (400 U.S. 25)/Dissent Brennan

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

Last Term, this Court held, over my dissent, that a plea of guilty may validly be induced by an unconstitutional threat to subject the defendant to the risk to death, so long as the plea is entered in open court and the defendant is represented by competent counsel who is aware of the threat, albeit not of its unconstitutionality. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 745 758, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1467-1474, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 795, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 1461, 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970). Today the Court makes clear that its previous holding was intended to apply even when the record demonstrates that the actual effect of the unconstitutional threat was to induce a guilty plea from a defendant who was unwilling to admit his guilt.

I adhere to the view that, in any given case, the influence of such an unconstitutional threat 'must necessarily be given weight in determining the voluntariness of a plea.' Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. at 805, 90 S.Ct., at 1458 (dissent). And, without reaching the question whether due process permits the entry of judgment upon a plea of guilty accompanied by a contemporaneous denial of acts constituting the crime, I believe that at the very least such a denial of guilt is also a relevant factor in determining whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made. With these factors in mind, it is sufficient in my view to state that the facts set out in the majority opinion demonstrate that Alford was 'so gripped by fear of the death penalty' that his decision to plead guilty was not voluntary but was 'the product of duress as much so as choice reflecting physical constraint.' Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 606, 68 S.Ct. 302, 307, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.