Nichols v. Coolidge/Opinion of the Court

Defendants in error sued to recover additional federal taxes wxacted of the estate in their keeping. The cause was heard upon an agreed statement; judgment went for them on a directed verdict; and this writ of error, allowed April 3, 1925, brings the matter here. In a comprehensive charged the trial court interpreted the law, but gave no further opinion. Coolidge v. Nichols (D. C.) 4 F.(2d) 112.

Mrs. Julia Coolidge, of Massachusetts, died January 6, 1921. As required by the Revenue Act approved February 24, 1919, c. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1096, the executors returned a schedule to the collector. He estimate the gross estate at $180,184.73 and allowed $77,747.74 deductions. They paid the amount assessed upon the balance. Their return did not include certain property transferred by the decedent through duly executed deeds and without valuable consideration, some to trustees and some directly to her children. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue held that under section 402(c), being Comp. St. § 6336 3/4 c, the value of all this property at her death must be included in the gross state. He raised the assessment accordingly and demanded the additional tax-$34,662.65-here challenged.

July 29, 1907, Mrs. Coolidge and her husbandowned certain real estate in Boston, also valuable personal property, which they transferred without consideration to trustees, who agreed to hold it any pay the income to the settlors, then to the survivor, and after his death to distribute the corpus among the settlors' five children or their representatives. The deed directed that the interest of any child predenceasing the survivor should pass as provided by the statute of distribution 'in effect at the time of the death of such survivor.' The trustees were authorized to sell the property, to make and change investments, etc. April 6, 1917, the settlors assigned to the children their entire interest in the property, especially any right to the income therefrom. At the death of Mrs. Coolidge the trustees held property worth $432,155.35, but through sales and changes much of what they originally received had passed from their possession.

May 18, 1917, by deeds purporting to convey the fee Mrs. Coolidge-her husband joining-gave their five children two parcels of land long used by her for residences. Contemporaneously the grantees leased these parcels to the conveyors for one year at nominal rental, with provision for annual renewals until notice to the contrary. All parties understood that renewals would be made if either lessee wished to occupy the premises. When Mrs. Coolidge died the value of this property was $274,300.

Plaintiff in error now maintains the above-described transfers by Mrs. Coolidge were intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death, within the ambit of section 402(c), Act February 24, 1919, and that the value at her death of the property held by the conveyees constituted part of her gross estate.

The court below held the transfer of the residences (1917) was absolute, the right to possess or enjoy them did not depend upon death, and their value constituted no part of the gross estate; also that under the statute the value of the property conveyed to trustees in 1907, or resulting therefrom, must be included in the gross estate, but, thus construed, the act went beyond the power of Congress.

Relevant portions of 'Title IV-Estate Tax,' Act February 24, 1919, are printed below. It undertakes to lay a charge equal to the sum of specified percentages-from 1 to 25-'of the value of the net estate * *  * upon the transfer of the net estate of every decedent' dying thereafter. And it directs that the net estate shall be ascertained by deducting from the gross certain items and an exemption of $50,000; also 'that the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated'-

(a) To the extent of his interest therein, subject to the payment of charges against the estate, expenses of administration, and subject to distribution. (b) The dower or curtesy, etc., interest of the surviving spouse. (c) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, or with respect to which he has at any time created a trust, in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death (whether such transfer or trust is made or created before or after the passage of this act), except in case of a bona fide sale for a fair consideration in money or money's worth. (d) Any interest held jointly with another and payable to the survivor. (e) Property passing under a general power of appointment. (f) The excess over $40,000 of insurance taken out by the decedent upon his own life.

Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U.S. 61, 62, 44 S.C.t. 293, 68 L. Ed. 564, says of this tax:

'This is not a tax upon a residue, it is a tax upon a     transfer of his net estate by a decedent, a distinction      marked by the words that we have quoted from the statute, and      previously commented upon at lengh in Knowlton v. Moore, 178      U.S. 41, 49, 77, 20 S.C.t. 747, 44 L. Ed. 969. It comes into     existence before and is independent of the receipt of the      property by the legatee. It taxes, as Hansen, Death Duties,     puts it in a passage cited in 178 U.S. 49, 20 S.C.t. 751,      'not the interest to which some person succeeds on a death,      but the interest which ceased by reason of the death."

Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47, 50, 44 S.C.t. 291, 68 L. Ed. 558:

'What was being imposed here (Act February 24, 1919) was an     excise upon the transfer of an estate upon death of the      owner.' Concerning transfer of the residences in 1917, the trial court charged

'I do not have much difficulty in reaching a conclusion     respecting the deeds of the Boston and Brookline real estate,      and I will first consider the claim of the parties respecting      those transfers.

'The deeds conveyed, with warranty covenants, absolute and     indefeasible title to the real estate without any valid      reservations, conditions, or restrictions whatsoever.

'The leases, executed the same day, were for one year or any     renewal thereof, but were always subject to the right in the      lessors to terminate the term during any year by giving the      notice as therein provided. It is conceded that the parties     contemplated that the premises would be enjoyed by the      decedent and her husband so long as they might desire to use      them for residential purposes, but the decedent had no valid      agreement to that effect. Her rights must be held to be     governed by the terms of the lease. If it could be said that     the grantee did not come into full possession and enjoyment      of the estate at the time of the conveyances-and I am      inclined to the opinion that they did-their right to come      into full possession did not depend in the slightest degree      upon the death of the grantor. The effect of this transaction     was to vest in the five sons named in the deed full and      complete title to the property including the right of      disposition. They had a right to sell the property subject to     the lease, and had all rights incident to ownership. There     was here a gift completed during the lifetime of the donor. The act of 1918 did not purport to tax such gifts.

'I have reached the conclusion, therefore, that respecting     the property conveyed by the deed the facts of this case do      not bring the property within the reach of the statute, and      that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was without authority to include the value of it as a part of      the gross estate. I therefore give the following     instructions, as requested by the plaintiffs: The real estate      referred to in the second count of the declaration was not a      part of the net estate of Julia Coolidge within the meaning      of the Revenue Act of 1918.'

We agree with this conclusion and accept as adequate the reasons advanced to support it.

Counsel for the United States argue that the challenged subsection only undertakes to tax the transfer from the dead and merely uses the gross estate to measure the charge. Taken together, sections 402, 408 and 409 disclose definite purpose to do much more than tax this transfer.

Section 402 (Comp. St. § 6336 3/4 c) directs that the gross estate shall be ascertained by including (among other things) the value at his death of all property-

'to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent     has at any time made a transfer, or with respect to which he      has at any time created a trust, in contemplation of or      intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or      after his death (whether such transfer or trust is made or      created before or after the passage of this act), except in      case of a bona fide sale for a fair consideration in money or      money's worth.'

The language of this section inhibits the conclusion that only subsequent transfers are to be included. Under Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 U.S. 238, 251, 45 S.C.t. 487, 6. L. Ed. 934, only such transfers come within section 402(f), Shwab v. Doyle, 258 U.S. 529, 536, 42 S.C.t. 391, 66 L. Ed. 747, 26 A. L. R. 1454, confined section 202(b), Act September 8, 1916, c. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 777-prototypes of section 402(c), Act 1919-to subsequent transfers. The emphatic words 'whether such transfer or trust is made or created before or after the passage of this act,' added by the latter act, evidently were intended to exclude a like construction.

Section 408 (Comp. St. § 6336 3/4 i) authorizes an executor to recover from one who receives life insurance 'such portion of the total tax paid as the proceeds, in excess of $40,000, of such policies bear to the net estate.' Section 409 (Comp. St. § 6336 3/4 j) imposes a lien to secure the tax upon the gross estate; and provides:

'If (a) the decedent makes a transfer of, or creates a trust     with respect to, any property in contemplation of or intended      to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his      death (except in the case of a bona fide sale for a fair      consideration in money or money's worth) or (b) if insurance      passes under a contract executed by the decedent in favor of      a specific beneficiary, and if in either case the tax in      respect thereto is not paid when due, then the transferee,      trustee, or beneficiary shall be personally liable for such      tax, and such property, to the extent of the decedent's      interest therein at the time of such transfer, or to the      extent of such beneficiary's interest under such contract of      insurance, shall be subject to a like lien equal to the      amount of such tax.'

For the United States it is said that the imposition under consideration is an exercise of the federal taxing power and is imposed upon a transmission of property by death. Also, that what Congress intended was to provide a measure for the tax which would operate equally upon all those who made testamentary dispositions of their property, whether this was by will or intestacy or only testamentary in effect; the immediate purpose was not to prevent evasions, for the statute applies to transactions completed when there was none to be evaded. And the conclusion is that the measure adopted is reasonable, since the specified transactions are testamentary in effect.

But the conveyance by Mrs. Coolidge to trustees was in no proper sense testamentary, and it bears no substantial relationship to the transfer by death. The mere desire to equalize taxation cannot justify a burden on something not within congressional power. The language of the statute is not consistent with the idea that it utilizes the gross estate merely to measure a proper charge upon the transfer by death. See Lewellyn v. Frick, supra; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 494, 45 S.C.t. 603, 606 (69 L. Ed. 1058, 42 A. L. R. 316) rejected a somewhat similar claim, and said:

'Of course, this was but the equivalent of saying that it was     admissible to measure the tax by a standard which took no      account of the distinction between what the state had power      to tax and what it had no power to tax, and which necessarily      operated to make the amount of the tax just what it would      have been had the state's power included what was excluded by      the Constitution. This ground, in our opinion, is not     tenable. It would open the way for easily doing indirectly     what is forbidden to be done directly, and would render      important constitutional limitations of no avail.'

The exaction is not a succession tax like the one sustained by Scholey v. Rew, 23 Wall. 331, 23 L. Ed. 99; Keeney v. New York, 222 U.S. 525, 32 S.C.t. 105, 59 L. Ed. 299, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1139. The right to become beneficially entitled is not the occasion for it. There is no claim that the transfers were made in contemplation of death or with purpose to evade taxation. The provision applicable in such circumstances is not relied on and the extent of congressional power to prevent evasion or defeat of duly imposed exactions need not be discussed.

Certainly Congress may lay an excise upon the transfer of property by death reckoned upon the value of the interest which passes thereby. But under the mere guise of reaching something within its powers Congress may not lay a charge upon what is beyond them. Taxes are very real things and statutes imposing them are estimated by practical results.

As the executors paid the contested charge out of property which actually passed by death, only their rights are here involved. If the fund held by them had been insufficient and payment had been exacted from others, somewhat different questions might require consideration. Lewellyn v. Frick, supra. The statute requires the executors to pay an excise ostensibly laid upon transfer of property by death from Mrs. Coolidge to them but reckoned upon its value plus the value of other property conveyed before the enactment in entire good faith and without contemplation of death. Is the statute, thus construed, within the power of Congress?

Undoubtedly, Congress may require that property subsequently transferred in contemplation of death be treated as part of the estate for purposes of taxation. This is necessary to prevent evasion and give practical effect to the exercise of admitted power, but the right is limited by the necessity.

Under the theory advanced for the United States, the arbitrary, whimsical and burdensome character of the challenged tax is plain enough. An excise is prescribed, but the amount of it is made to depend upon past lawful transactions, not testamentary in character and beyond recall. Property of small value transferred before death may have become immensely valuable, and the estate tax, swollen by this, may leave nothing for distribution. Real estate transferred years ago, when of small value, may be worth an enormous sum at the death. If the deceased leaves no estate there can be no tax; if, on the other hand, he leaves ten dollars both that and the real estate become liable. Different estates must bear disproportionate burdens determined by what the deceased did one or twenty years before he died. See Frew v. Bowers, Collector (C. C. A.) 12 F. (2d) 625.

This court has recognized that a statute purporting to tax may be so arbitrary and capricious as to amount to confiscation and offend the Fifth Amendment. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R., 240 U.S. 1, 24, 36 S.C.t. 236, 60 L. Ed. 493, L. R. A. 1917D, 414, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 713; Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U.S. 442, 450, 45 S.C.t. 135, 348, 69 L. Ed. 703. See, also, Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 77, 20 S.C.t. 747, 44 L. Ed. 969. And we must conclude that section 402(c) of the statute here under consideration, in so far as it requires that there shall be included in the gross estate the value of property transferred by a decedent prior to its passage merely because the conveyance was intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death, is arbitrary, capricious and amounts to confiscation. Whether or how far the challenged provision is valid in respect of transfers made subsequent to the enactment, we need not now consider.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed.

Mr. Justice HOLMES, Mr. Justice BRANDEIS, Mr. Justice SANFORD, and Mr. Justice STONE concur in the result.