Nichols Assignee v. Eaton/Opinion of the Court

The claim of the assignee is founded on the proposition, ably presented here by counsel, that a will which expresses a purpose to vest in a devisee either personal property, or the income of personal or real property, and secure to him its enjoyment free from liability for his debts, is void on grounds of public policy, as being in fraud of the rights of creditors; or as expressed by Lord Eldon in Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 433, 'If property is given to a man for his life, the donor cannot take away the incidents of a life-estate.'

There are two propositions to be considered as arising on the face of this will as applicable to the facts stated: 1. Does the true construction of the will bring it within that class of cases, the provisions of which on this point are void under the principle above stated? and 2. If so, is that principle to be the guide of a court of the United States sitting in chancery?

Taking for our guide the cases decided in the English courts, the doctrine of the case of Brandon v. Robinson seems to be pretty well established. It is equally well settled that a devise of the income of property, to cease on the insolvency or bankruptcy of the devisee, is good, and that the limitation is valid. Demmill v. Bedford, 3 Ves. 149; Brandon v. Robinson, 18 id. 429; Rockford v. Hackmen, 9 Hare; Lewin on Trusts, 80, ch. vii., sect. 2; Tillinghast v. Bradford, 5 R. I. 205.

If there had been no further provision in regard to the mater in this will than that on the bankruptcy or insolvency of the devisee, the trust as to him should cease and determine; or if there had been a simple provision, that, in such event, that part of the income of the estate should go to some specified person other than the bankrupt, there would be no difficulty in the case. But the first trust declared after the bankruptcy for this part of the income is in favor of the wife, child, or children of such bankrupt, and in such manner as said trustees in their discretion shall think proper. If the bankrupt devisee had a wife or child living to take under this branch, of the will, there does not seem to be any doubt that there would be nothing left which could go to his assignee in bankruptcy. The cases on this point are well considered in Lewin on Trusts, above cited; and the doctrine may be stated, that a direction that the trust to the first taker shall cease on his bankruptcy, and shall then go to his wife or children, is valid, and the entire interest passes to them; but that if the devise be to him and his wife or children, or if he is in any way to receive a vested interest, that interest, whatever it may be, may be separated from those of his wife or children, and be paid over to his assignee. Page v. Way, 3 Beav. 20; Perry v. Roberts, 1 Myl. & K. 4; Rippon v. Norton, 2 Beav. 63; Lord v. Bunn, 2 You. & Coll. Ch. 98. Where, however, the devise over is for the support of the bankrupt and his family, in such manner as the trustees may think proper, the weight of authority in England seems to be against the proposition that any thing is left to which the assignee can assert a valid claim. Twopenny v. Peyton, 10 Sim. 487; Godden v. Crowhurst, id. 642.

In the case before us, the trustees are authorized, in the event of the bankruptcy of one of the sons of testatrix without wife or children (which is the condition of the trust as to Amasa M. Eaton), to loan and reinvest that portion of the income of the estate in augmentation of the principal sum or capital of the estate until his decease, or until he shall have wife or children capable of receiving the trust of the testatrix forfeited by him.

There does not seem, thus far, any intention to secure or revest in the bankrupt any interest in the devise which he had forfeited; and there can be no doubt, that, but for the subsequent clauses of the will, there would be nothing in which the assignee could claim an interest. But there are the provisions, that the trustees may, at their discretion, transfer at any time to either of the devisees the half or any less proportion of the share of the fund itself which said devisee would be entitled to if the whole fund were to be equally distributed; and the further provision, that, after the cesser of income provided for in case of bankruptcy or other cause, it shall be lawful, but not obligatory on her said trustees, to pay to said bankrupt or insolvent son, or to apply for the use of his family, such and so much of said income as said son would have been entitled to in case the forfeiture had not happened.

It is strongly argued that these provisions are designed to evade the policy of the law already mentioned; that the discretion vested in the trustees is equivalent to a direction, and that it was well known it would be exercised in favor of the bankrupt.

The two cases of Twopenny v. Peyton and Godden v. Crowhurst, above cited from 10 Sim., seem to be in conflict with this doctrine; while the cases cited in appellant's brief go no farther than to hold, that when there is a right to support or maintenance in the bankrupt, or the bankrupt and his family, a right which he could enforce, then such interest, if it can be ascertained, goes to the assignee.

No case is cited, none is known to us, which goes so far as to hold that an absolute discretion in the trustee-a discretion which, by the express language of the will, he is under no obligation to exercise in favor of the bankrupt-confers such an interest on the latter, that he or his assignee in bankruptcy can successfully assert it in a court of equity or any other court.

As a proposition, then, unsupported by any adjudged case, it does not commend itself to our judgment on principle. Conceding to its fullest extent the doctrine of the English courts, their decisions are all founded on the proposition, that there is somewhere in the instrument which creates the trust a substantial right, a right which the appropriate court would enforce, left in the bankrupt after his insolvency, and after the cesser of the original and more absolute interest conferred by the earlier clauses of the will. This constitutes the dividing-line in the cases which are apparently in conflict. Applying this test to the will before us, it falls short, in our opinion, of conferring any such right on the bankrupt. Neither of the clauses of the provisos contain any thing more than a grant to the trustees of the purest discretion to exercise their power in favor of testatrix's sons. It would be a sufficient answer to any attempt on the part of the son in any court to enforce the exercise of that discretion in his favor, that the testatrix has in express terms said that such exercise of this discretion is not 'in any manner obligatory upon them,'-words repeated in both these clauses. To compel them to pay any of this income to a son after bankruptcy, or to his assignee, is to make a will for the testatrix which she never made; and to do it by a decree of a court is to substitute the discretion of the chancellor for the discretion of the trustees, in whom alone she reposed it. When trustees are in existence, and capable of acting, a court of equity will not interfere to control them in the exercise of a discretion vested in them by the instrument under which they act. Hill on Trustees, 486; Lewin on Trusts, 538; Boss v. Goodsall, 1 Younge Collier, 617; Maddison v. Andrew, 1 Ves. Sr. 60. And certainly they would not do so in violation of the wishes of the testator.

But, while we have thus attempted to show that Mrs. Eaton's will is valid in all its parts upon the extremest doctrine of the English Chancery Court, we do not wish to have it understood that we accept the limitations which that court has placed upon the power of testamentary disposition of property by its owner. We do not see, as implied in the remark of Lord Eldon, that the power of alienation is a necessary incident to a life-estate in real property, or that the rents and profits of real property and the interest and dividends of personal property may not be enjoyed by an individual without liability for his debts being attached as a necessery incident to such enjoyment. This doctrine is one which the English Chancery Court has ingrafted upon the common law for the benefit of creditors, and is comparatively of modern origin. We concede that there are limitations which public policy or general statutes impose upon all dispositions of property, such as those designed to prevent perpetuities and accumulations of real estate in corporations and ecclesiastical bodies. We also admit that there is a just and sound policy peculiarly appropriate to the jurisdiction of courts of equity to protect creditors against frauds upon their rights, whether they be actual or constructive frauds. But the doctrine, that the owner of property, in the free exercise of his will in disposing of it, cannot so dispose of it, but that the object of his bounty, who parts with nothing in return, must hold it subject to the debts due his creditors, though that may soon deprive him of all the benefits sought to be conferred by the testator's affection or generosity, is one which we are not prepared to announce as the doctrine of this court.

If the doctrine is to be sustained at all, it must rest exclusively on the rights in creditors. Whatever may be the extent of those rights in England, the policy of the States of this Union, as expressed both by their statutes and the decisions of their courts, has not been carried so far in that direction.

It is believed that every State in the Union has passed statutes by which a part of the property of the debtor is exempt from seizure on execution or other process of the courts; in short, is not by law liable to the payment of his debts. This exemption varies in its extent and nature in the different States. In some it extends only to the merest implements of household necessity; in others it includes the library of the professional man, however extensive, and the tools of the mechanic; and in many it embraces the homestead in which the family resides. This has come to be considered in this country as a wise, as it certainly may be called a settled, policy in all the States. To property so exempted the creditor has no right to look, and does not look, as a means of payment when his debt is created; and while this court has steadily held, under the constitutional provision against impairing the obligations of contracts by State laws, that such exemption laws, when first enacted, were invalid as to debts then in existence, it has always held, that, as to contracts made thereafter, the exemptions were valid.

This distinction is well founded in the sound and unanswerable reason, that the creditor is neither defrauded nor injured by the application of the law to his case, as he knows, when he parts with the consideration of his debt, that the property so exempt can never be made liable to its payment. Nothing is withdrawn from this liability which was ever subject to it, or to which he had a right to look for its discharge in payment. The analogy of this principle to the devise of the income from real and personal property for life seems perfect. In this country, all wills or other instruments creating such trust-estates are recorded in public offices, where they may be inspected by every one; and the law in such cases imputes notice to all persons concerned of all the facts which they might know by the inspection. When, therefore, it appears by the record of a will that the devisee holds this life-estate or income, dividends, or rents of real or personal property, payable to him alone, to the exclusion of the alienee or creditor, the latter knows, that, in creating a debt with such person, he had no right to look to that income as a means of discharging it. He is neither misled nor defrauded when the object of the testator is carried out by excluding him from any benefit of such a devise.

Nor do we see any reason, in the recognized nature and tenure of property and its transfer by will, why a testator who gives, who gives without any pecuniary return, who gets nothing of property value from the donee, may not attach to that gift the incident of continued use, of uninterrupted benefit of the gift, during the life of the donee. Why a parent, or one who loves another, and wishes to use his own property in securing the object of his affection, as far as property can do it, from the ills of life, the vicissitudes of fortune, and even his own improvidence, or incapacity for self-protection, should not be permitted to do so, is not readily perceived.

These views are well supported by adjudged cases in the State courts of the highest character.

In the case of Fisher v. Taylor, 2 Rawle, 33, a testator had directed his executors to purchase a tract of land, and take the title in their name in trust for his son, who was to have the rents, issues, and profits of it during his life, free from liability for any debts then or thereafter contracted by him. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that this life-estate was not liable to execution for the debts of the son. 'A man,' says the court, 'may undoubtedly dispose of his land so as to secure to the object of his bounty, and to him exclusively, the annual profits. The mode in which he accomplishes such a purpose is by creating a trust-estate, explicitly designating the uses and defining the powers of the trustees. . . . Nor is such a provision contrary to the policy of the law or to any act of assembly. Creditors cannot complain because they are bound to know the foundation on which they extend their credit.'

In the subsequent case of Holdship v. Patterson, 7 Watts, 547, where the friends of a man made contributions by a written agreement to the support of himself and family, the court held that the instalments which they had promised to pay could not be diverted by his creditors to the payment of his debts; and Gibson, C. J., remarks, that 'the fruit of their bounty could not have been turned from its object by the defendant's creditors, had it been applicable by the terms of the trust to his personal maintenance; for a benefactor may certainly provide for the maintenance of a friend, without exposing his bounty to the debts or imprudence of the beneficiary.' In the same court, as late as 1864, it was held that a devise to a son of the rents and profits of an estate during his natural life, without being subject to his debts and liabilities, is a valid trust; and, the estate being vested in trustees, the son could not alienate. Shankland's Appeal, 47 Penn. St. 113.

The same proposition is either expressly or impliedly asserted by that court in the cases of Ashurst v. Given, 5 W. & S. 323; Brown v. Williamson, 36 Penn. St. 338; Still v. Spear, 45 id. 168.

In the case of Leavitt v. Bierne, 21 Conn. Waite, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says, 'We think it in the power of a parent to place property in the hands of trustees for the benefit of a son and his wife and children, with full power in them to manage and apply it at their discretion, without any power in the son to interfere in that management, or in the disposition of it until it has actually been paid over to him by the trustees;' and he proceeds to argue in favor of the existence of this power, from the vicious habits or intemperate character of the son, and the right of the father to provide against these misfortunes.

In the case of Nickell et al. v. Handly et al., 10 Gratt. 336, the court thus expresses its view on the general question, though not, perhaps, strictly necessary to the judgment in that case: 'There is nothing in the nature or law of property which would prevent the testatrix, when about to die, from appropriating her property to the support of her poor and helpless relatives, according to the different conditions and wants of such relatives; nothing to prevent her from charging her property with the expense of food, raiment, and shelter for such relatives. There is nothing in law or reason which should prevent her from appointing an agent or trustee to administer her bounty.'

In the case of Pope's Executors v. Elliott & Co., 8 Ben. Monr. 56, the testator had directed his executors to pay for the support of Robert Pope the sum of $25 per month. Rebert Pope having been in the Rocky Mountains until the sum of $225 of these monthly payments had accumulated in the hands of the executors, his creditors filed a bill in chancery, accompanied by an attachment, to subject this fund to the payment of their debt.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky say that it was the manifest intent of the testator to secure to Robert the means of support during his life to the extent of $25 per month, or $300 per year; and that this intent cannot be thwarted, either by Robert himself by assignment or alienation, or by his creditors seizing it for his debts, unless the provision is contrary to law or public policy. After an examination of the statutes of Kentucky and the general principles of equity jurisprudence on this subject, they hold that neither of these are invaded by the provision of the will.

The last case we shall refer to specially is that of Campbell v. Foster, 35 N. Y. Court of Appeals, 361.

In that case it is held, after elaborate consideration, that the interest of a beneficiary in a trust-fund, created by a person other than the debtor, cannot be reached by a creditor's bill; and, while the argument is largely based upon the special provision of the statute regulating the jurisdiction of the court in that class of cases, the result is placed with equal force of argument on the general doctrines of the Court of Chancery, and the right of the owner of property to give it such direction as he may choose without its being subject to the debts of those upon whom he intends to confer his bounty.

We are not called upon in this connection to say how far we would feel bound, in a case originating in a State where the doctrine of the English courts had been adopted so as to become a rule of property, if such a proposition could be predicated of a rule like this. Nor has the time which the pressure of business in this court authorizes us to devote to this case permitted any further examination into the decisions of the State courts. We have indicated our views in this matter rather to forestall the inference, that we recognize the doctrine relied on by appellants, and not much controverted by opposing counsel, than because we have felt it necessary to decide it, though the judgment of the court may rest equally well on either of the propositions which we have discussed. We think the decree of the court below may be satisfactorily affirmed on both of them.

Other objections have been urged by counsel; such as that the bankrupt is himself one of the trustees of the will, and will exercise his discretion favorably to himself. But there are two other trustees, and it requires their joint action to confer on him the benefits of this trust. It is said that one of them is mentally incompetent to act; but this is not established by the testimony. It is said also, that, since his bankruptcy, the defendant, Amasa, has actually received $25,000 of this fund; and that should go to the assignee, as it shows conclusively that the objections to the validity of the will were well founded.

But the conclusive answer to all these objections is, that, by the will of decedent,-a will which, as we have shown, she had a lawful right to make,-the insolvency of her son terminated all his legal vested right in her estate, and left nothing in him which could go to his creditors, or to his assignees in bankruptcy, or to his prior assignee; and that what may have come to him after his bankruptcy through the voluntary action of the trustees, under the terms of the discretion reposed in them, is his lawfully, and cannot now be subjected to the control of his assignee.

Decree affirmed.