Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series II/Volume I/Constantine/Prolegomena/Life/Second Five Years

&#167;4. Second Five Years.

This period was most momentous for the world&#8217;s history. Maxentius, seeking an excuse for war against Constantine, found it in a pretended desire to avenge his father (Zos. 2. 14), and prepared for war. Like his father before him, however, he did not know his man. Constantine&#8217;s mind was prepared. He was alert and ready to act. He gathered all the forces, German, Gallic, and British (Zos. 2. 15) that he could muster, left a portion for the protection of the Rhine, entered Italy by way of the Alps (Paneg.), and marched to meet the much more numerous forces of Maxentius,&#8212;Romans, Italians, Tuscans, Carthagenians, and Sicilians (Zos. 2. 15). First Sigusium was taken by storm (Naz. Paneg. [321] c. 17 and 21; Paneg. [313] c. 5); then the cavalry of Maxentius was defeated at Turin (Naz. Paneg. [321] c. 22; Paneg. [313] c. 6). After a few days&#8217; rest in Milan (Paneg. [313] c. 7) he continued his triumphant march, defeating the enemy again in a cavalry engagement at Brescia (Naz. Paneg. c. 25), and taking the strongly fortified Verona after a hard-fought battle before the walls (Anon. Vales. p. 473; Paneg. [313]; Naz. Paneg. c. 25&#8211;26). This had taken him out of his way a little; but now there were no enemies in the rear, and he was free to push on to Rome, on his way whither, if not earlier, he had his famous vision of the cross. He reached the Tiber October 26. Maxentius, tempted by a dubious oracle issued from Rome, crossed the Tiber, and joined battle. His apparently unwise action in staking so much on a pitched battle has its explanation, if we could believe Zosimus (2. 15), Eusebius (V. C. 1. 38), Praxagoras, and others. His object was, it is said, by a feigned retreat to tempt Constantine across the bridge of boats which he had built in such a way that it could be broken, and the enemy let into the river. If it was a trick, he at least fell into his own pit. The dissipated soldiers of Maxentius gave way before the hardy followers of Constantine, fired by his own energy and the sight of the cross. The defeat was a rout. The bridge broke. Maxentius, caught in the jam, was cast headlong into the river (Anon. Val. p. 473; Lact. c. 44; Chron. Pasch. p. 521, &amp;c.); and after a vain attempt to climb out on the steep bank opposite (Paneg. [313] c. 17), was swept away by the stream. The next day his body was found, the head cut off (Praxag.; Anon. Vales. p. 473), and carried into the city (Anon. Vales. p. 473) on the point of a spear (Paneg. [313] c. 18; Zos. 2. 17; Praxag. p. 1). Constantine entered the city in triumph amid rejoicings of the people, exacted penalties from a few of those most intimate with Maxentius (Zos. 2. 17), disbanded the Pr&#230;torian Guards (Vict. C&#230;s. p. 159; Zos. 2. 17), raised a statue to himself, and did many other things which are recorded; and if he did as many things which are not recorded as there are recorded things which he did not do, he must have been very busy in the short time he remained there.

Constantine was now sole emperor in the West, and the emperors were reduced to three. History was making fast. After a very brief stay in Rome he returned to Milan (Lact. c. 45), where Licinius met him (Anon. Vales. p. 473; Lact. c. 25; Vict. Epit. p. 50; Zos. 2. 17, &amp;c.). It had become of mutual advantage to these emperors to join alliance. So a betrothal had been made, and now the marriage of Licinius to the sister of Constantine was celebrated (cf. refs. above Lact.; Vict.; Zos.; Anon. Vales.). At the same time the famous Second Edict or Edict of Milan was drawn up by the two emperors (Euseb. H. E. 10. 5; Lact. c. 48), and probably proclaimed. Constantine then returned to Gaul (Anon. Vales. p. 473; Zos. 11. 17), where he was forced into another sort of strenuous warfare&#8212;the ecclesiastical, taking a hand somewhat against his will in trying to settle the famous Donatist schism.

Licinius had a more critical problem to meet. Maximin thought it a good time to strike while Licinius was off in Milan engaged in festivities (Lact. c. 45); but the latter, hastily gathering his troops and pushing on by forced marches, met near Heraclea and utterly defeated him (Lact. c. 46). Maximin fled precipitately, escaping the sword only to die a more terrible death that same summer (Lact. c. 49; Euseb. V. C. 1. 58; cf. Zos. 2. 17). The death of Maximin cleared the field still farther. Through progressive subtractions the number of emperors had been reduced to two,&#8212;one in the East and one in the West.

They, too, promptly fell out. The next year they were at war. Causes and pretexts were various; but the pretext, if not the cause, was in general that Licinius proved an accomplice after the fact, at least, to a plot against Constantine. Whatever the immediate cause, it was one of the inevitabilities of fate. Another vigorous campaign followed, characterized by the same decisive action and personal courage on the part of Constantine which he had already shown, and which supplied his lack of soldiers. First at Cibalis in Pannonia (Oct. 8), then in a desperate battle at Mardia, Licinius was defeated and forced to make peace (Anon. Vales. p. 474; Zos. 2. 19&#8211;20). The world was re-divided between the affectionate brothers-in-law, and Constantine took Illyrium to his other possessions. After this battle and the re-division there was a truce between the emperors for some years, during the early part of which (in 316 or 315) the Decennalia of Constantine were celebrated (Euseb. V. C. 1. 48).