Newsom v. Smyth/Dissent Douglas

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice BLACK concur, dissenting.

In April 1953 petitioner was found guilty of murder in the first degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. At the trial, petitioner had been represented by counsel, although at allocution he had complained that his counsel had failed to present relevant evidence. On April 18, 1953, petitioner wrote to the trial judge at his trial, noting an appeal within the time allowed therefor under Virginia law. In a second letter written five days later, petitioner requested 'that you appoint me counsel to appeal my case to the State Supreme Court of Appeals.' To neither letter did he receive any reply. He took no further steps to appeal his conviction.

In January 1959 he filed in the Virginia court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Law and Equity Court of Richmond concluded that the petition did not allege 'a failure of the trial court to accord to the accused those procedural safeguards guaranteed to him by the state and federal constitutions,' and accordingly denied the writ. Petitioner sought review by the Supreme Court of Appeals, and that court refused to issue a writ of error. Then petitioner sought review here, and certiorari was granted. 363 U.S. 802, 80 S.Ct. 1240, 4 L.Ed.2d 1146.

The question raised by petitioner is substantial: Does the Federal Constitution obligate the several States to appoint counsel to assist indigent defendants to pursue whatever appellate remedies the States may offer? Cf. Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891.

The opinion of the Law and Equity Court of Richmond discussed the problem of this case in those terms. After an extended discussion of the right of indigents to counsel, that court quoted from 55 A.L.R.2d at page 1085, 2 L.Ed.2d at page 1649, the following:

' * *  * Thus, the establishment of the rule that a state must,      as a matter of federal constitutional law, provide indigents      with the assistance of counsel to prosecute appeals in      criminal cases would appear to be no more than a logical      extension of the Griffin doctrine.'

'Whether this view be correct or incorrect is, of course, the     question in the instant case.' And the Supreme Court of Appeals in refusing a petition for writ of error said that the judgment was 'plainly right.' Regardless of whether the courts below were 'required to find' that petitioner had adequately stated his federal claim, those courts in fact did so find as the adjudication was on the issues exposed in the record.

The question whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires appointment of counsel for indigents to represent them on appeal from state court judgments of conviction is present and ripe for decision. I dissent from the dismissal of the certiorari.