National Life Insurance Company v. National Life Insurance Company/Opinion of the Court

The record shows that the defendant company was first incorporated in Vermont in 1848 by act of the legislature, under the name 'National Life Insurance Company of the United States;' but in 1858 the legislature of that state altered the name to 'National Life Insurance Company,' and this was ten years prior to the incorporation of the Washington, District of Columbia, corporation. The defendant company has, ever since that time, maintained the name given it in 1858, and it was in use by it when, in 1860, it was admitted to do business in Illinois. It established a business office in Chicago prior to 1868, and has since that time continuously made use of the mails of the United States, under its corporate name.

After the Washington company was incorporated, in August, 1868, it was admitted to do business in the state of Illinois, but it was not until 1874 that it established in the city of Chicago what it denominated its principal branch office.

The defendant company, under the law of Illinois, places on its signs in the building where it does business a statement that it was incorporated in Vermont, but its corporate name has no such addition.

Both companies being engaged in the life insurance business in various states, and, after 1874, both having business officers in Chicago, are constantly receiving letters through the mails. Large numbers of them are properly addressed, those intended for the complainant being addressed to it by its own name, to which is usually added the street number of the building in which it has its office, 159 La Salle street, while those intended for the defendant company are addressed to it by name, with the addition of Marquette building, where its office is, or they are addressed to D. G. Drake, its manager. The difficulty has arisen over letters which were simply addressed 'National Life Insurance Company, Chicago, Illinois,' and these have, with the exception of a brief time between January and July, 1905, been delivered to the defendant company, in the Marquette building. After they have been there opened such of them as have been intended for the complainant have been returned to the postoffice at Chicago, from which they have been then delivered to the complainant. A very large proportion of the letters thus addressed have proved, upon being opened, to have been intended for the complainant. The letters that are addressed to the defendant by its corporate name cannot be known to have been intended for the complainant until they have been opened. In other words, there is nothing on the outside of the letters from which it could be determined that they were not intended for the company to which they were addressed by its corporate name, but for the complainant. Some of the letters thus addressed have been, in fact, intended for the defendant company, although a very small proportion of them.

As the defendant company used its name long prior to the adoption of a somewhat similar name by the complainant, it is apparent that the confusion which has arisen therefrom in regard to the mail delivered at Chicago is not at all the fault of the defendant company. The whole claim of the complainant rests upon the averment that a very large majority of the letters that are addressed to the defendant company by its own name alone are in reality intended for the complainant. This fact does not clothe the complainant with the legal right to insist that the Chicago postmaster shall be directed to deliver all mail of the character in question to a corporation other than that to which the mail is addressed. It is a matter of confusion arising from a similarity of names, wherein the greater proportion of the total amount of the mail thus addressed belongs to the complainant, although not addressed to it, and yet some portion of the mail thus addressed actually belongs to the company to which the mail is in fact addressed. There are no means of discovering to which company the letters belong short of opening them. The complainant, by adopting greater caution in the matter of directions to its correspondents as to the proper address, might probably be able to secure more correctness in the direction of letters intended for it.

In the endeavor to discharge its duty the Department has provided, in paragraph 4 of § 645 of its Postal Laws and Regulations of 1902, the following general regulation: 'Attempts to secure the mail of an established house, firm, or corporation through the adoption of a similar name should not be recognized. Where disputes arise between individuals, firms, or corporations as to the use of a name or designation, matter addressed to a street, number, or building should be delivered according to such address. When not so addressed the mail will be delivered to the firm or corporation which first adopted the name of the address at that place.'

The Postoffice Department made a special order herein, following substantially that rule. The appeal made by the complainant to the Department was really nothing but an appeal to its discretion; complainant could only have asked for the order because, upon the whole, it was thought but fair and equitable that the corporation for which, in a great majority of cases, the letters were probably intended, should have them, although letters so addressed were, in a number of cases, intended for the corporation named on them. The court is now asked, in effect, to review and reverse that order, not because the complainant has a legal right to the delivery of all these letters, but only because, judging from the past, the numbers intended for complainant are many more than those intended for defendant, even though all are addressed to the latter. The court is therefore asked to judge by the experience of the past, although in making the order asked for it inevitably directs the delivery of some letters to the wrong party, and in opposition to the address upon the letters. Assuming that the court in some cases has the power to, in effect, review the determination of the Department, we do not think this is an occasion for its exercise. The complainant is really appealing from the discretion of the Department to the discretion of the court, and the complainant has, no clear legal right to obtain the order sought. See Bates & G. Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106-108, 48 L. ed. 894, 895, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 595.

A court in such case ought not to interfere in the administration of a great Department like that of the Postoffice by an injunction which directs the Department how to conduct the business thereof, where the party asking for the injunction has no clear right to it.

This case has nothing in common with American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 47 L. ed. 90, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33. There the Postoffice Department was assuming to act under a statute giving it the power to refuse to deliver mail matter to an individual guilty of fraud in his business, and this court held that the case made did not show that the plaintiff in error had been guilty of any conduct that could be held to be a fraud under the statute under which the Postoffice Department was acting. The Department was, therefore, without jurisdiction to make the order, which was reversed in this court.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals must be affirmed.