Nashville Milk Company v. Carnation Company Safeway Stores/Opinion of the Court

Petitioner, alleging that it had been injured by respondent's sales at unreasonably low prices in violation of § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13a, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13a, sued the respondent for treble damages and injunctive relief under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15, 26. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the private remedies afforded by §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act cannot be based on a violation of § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 238 F.2d 86. We brought the case here, 352 U.S. 1023, 77 S.Ct. 590, 1 L.Ed.2d 595, to resolve a conflict between the ruling below and a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit holding that such a private action does lie. Vance v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 239 F.2d 144.

Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act permit private actions of this kind only for injuries resulting from practices forbidden by the 'antitrust laws' as defined in § 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 12, namely: (1) the Sherman Act (Act of July 2, 1890, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 15 note); (2) parts of the Wilson Tariff Act (Act of August 27, 1894, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 8-11); (3) the Act amending the Wilson Tariff Act (Act of February 12, 1913, 15 U.S.C.A. § 11); and (4) the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 12 et seq. ('this Act'). In light of the much other so-called antitrust legislation enacted prior and subsequent to the Clayton Act, it seems plain that the rule expressio unius exclusio alterius is applicable, and that the definition contained in § 1 of the Clayton Act is exclusive. Therefore it is of no moment here that the Robinson-Patman Act may be colloquially described as an 'antitrust' statute. And since no one claims that § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act can be regarded as an amendment to the Sherman Act or the Wilson Tariff Act, the precise issue before us is whether Congress made that section of the Robinson-Patman Act a part of the Clayton Act, thus making it one of the 'antitrust laws' whose violation can lead to the private causes of action authorized by §§ 4 and 16. For the reasons stated below we hold that this is not the case.

The Robinson-Patman Act, consisting of our sections, convincingly shows on its face that § 3 does not amend the Clayton Act, but stands on its own footing and carries its own sanctions.

The first section of the Act does expressly amend § 2 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits certain kinds of price discriminations, and allied activities, on the part of those engaged in domestic or territorial commerce. The first paragraph of this section reads:

'That section 2 of the (Clayton Act) * *  * is amended to read      as follows: *  *  * ' The section then sets forth in haec verba, and within quotation marks, all the provisions of § 2, as modified by the amending language. 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(a).

Two other sections of the Act are not in point here. Section 2 simply applies the amending provisions of § 1 to litigation commenced under the former provisions of § 2 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21a, 15 U.S.C.A. § 21a; and § 4 deals with certain practices of cooperative associations. 15 U.S.C. § 13b, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13b.

The only other section of the Act is § 3, with which we are concerned here. It prohibits three kinds of trade practices, (a) general price discriminations, (b) geographical price discriminations, and (c) selling 'at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.' The important thing to note is that this section, in contrast to § 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act, does not on its face amend the Clayton Act. Further, § 3 contains only penal sanctions for violation of it provisions; in the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent to the contrary, these sanctions should under familiar principles be considered exclusive, rather than supplemented by civil sanctions of a distinct statute. See D. R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Refining Co., 236 U.S. 165, 174-175, 35 S.Ct. 398, 401, 59 L.Ed. 520.

The conclusion that only § 1 of the Robinson-Patman Act can be regarded as amendatory of the Clayton Act is further borne out by the title of the whole Robinson-Patman Act, which reads (49 Stat. 1526):

'An Act

'To amend section 2 of (the Clayton Act) * *  * and for other      purposes.' (Italics added.)

The 'other purposes' can only refer to the sections of the Act other than the first section.

Because there is a partial overlap between the price-discrimination clauses of § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act (see note 1, supra) and those of § 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the first section of the Robinson-Patman Act, it is argued that it would be anomalous to allow a private cause of action for price discrimination in violation of § 2 of the Clayton Act but to deny a private cause of action based on a violation of § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. This argument, however, over-looks the fact that § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act includes a provision which is not found in § 2 of the Clayton Act, namely, selling 'at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.' It is not an idle conjecture that the possibility of abuse inherent in a private cause of action based upon this vague provision was among the factors which led Congress to leave the enforcement of the provisions of § 3 solely in the hands of the public authorities, except to the extent that violation of any of its provisions also constituted a violation of § 2 of the Clayton Act, and as such was subject to private redress under §§ 4 and 16 of that Act. In any event, in the absence of a much clearer indication of congressional intent than is present in these statutory provisions and their legislative history (355 U.S. 380, 78 S.Ct. 356), we should not read the Robinson-Patman Act as subjecting violations of the 'unreasonably low prices' provision of § 3 to the private remedies given by the Clayton Act.

Respondent calls our attention to the fact that the 1940 U.S.C.ode codifies § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act as being among the 'antitrust laws' embraced in § 1 of the Clayton Act. However, reference to the 1926 and 1934 Codes shows that the 1940 codification was a palpable error. Moreover, this codification seems to us, for the reasons set forth in this opinion, to be manifestly inconsistent with the Robinson-Patman Act, and in such circumstances Congress has specifically provided that the underlying statute must prevail. Act of June 30, 1926, 32(a), vol. 1 U.S.C. (1952 ed.), p. LXIII, 1 U.S.C.A. preceding section 1; see Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S. 423, 426, 63 S.Ct. 1135, 1136, 87 L.Ed. 1490.

What appears from the face of the Robinson-Patman Act finds full support in its legislative history. The fair conclusions to be drawn from that history are (a) that § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act was not intended to become part of the Clayton Act, and (b) that the section was intended to carry only criminal sanctions, except that price discriminations, to the extent that they were common to both that section and § 2 of the Clayton Act, were also understood to carry, under the independent force of the Clayton, Act, the private remedies provided in §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act. In other words, although price discriminations are both criminally punishable (under § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act) and subject to civil redress (under § 2 of the Clayton Act), selling 'at unreasonably low prices' is subject only to the criminal penalties provided in § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. This is evident from the Conference Report on the bill, which states:

'SECTION

'The provisions of section 2 of the House bill were agreed     to without amendment by the Senate. * *  * (I)t appears in the      conference report as section 2 of the bill itself, rather that as part of the      amendment to section 2 of the Clayton Act which is provided      for in section 1 to the present bill.

'SECTION

'Subsection (h) of the Senate amendment * *  * appears in the      conference report as section 3 of the bill itself. It     contains the operative and penal provisions of what was      originally the Borah-Van Nuys bill (S. 4171). While they     overlap in some respects, they are in no way inconsistent      with th provisions of the Clayton Act amendment provided for      in section 1. Section 3 authorizes nothing which that     amendment prohibits, and takes nothing from it. On the     contrary, where only civil remedies and liabilities attach to      violations of the amendment provided in section 1, section 3      sets up special prohibitions as to the particular offenses      therein described and attaches to them also the criminal      penalties therein provided.' H.R.Rep. No. 2951, 74th Cong.,     2d Sess., p. 8. (Italics added.)

Further excerpts from the legislative history, set forth in the margin, also bear out the conclusions stated at the outset of this part of our opinion.

Finally, it is noteworthy, by way of epitomizing the conclusions to be drawn from the legislative history, that in 1950 Representative Patman (a coauthor of the Robinson-Patman Act) stated in testimony before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary (Hearing on H.R. 7905, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., Serial No. 14, Part 5, p. 48):

' * *  * it happens that section 3, the criminal section of the      Robinson-Patman Act, was not, under the terms of that act,      made an amendment to the Clayton Act. Moreover, section 3 of     the Robinson-Patman Act has never been added to the list of      laws designated as 'antitrust laws' in section 1 of the      Clayton Act.'

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a private cause of action does not lie for practices forbidden only by § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. To the extent that such practices also constitute a violation of § 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended, they are actionable by one injured thereby solely under that Act. Since no such infringement of § 2 is alleged here, the complaint in this case was properly dismissed.

Affirmed.