Nacirema Operating Company v. Johnson/Dissent Douglas

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK and Mr. Justice BRENNAN concur, dissenting.

We dissent for the reasons stated by Judge Sobeloff speaking for the Court of Appeals sitting en banc. 398 F.2d 900. As he says, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is not restricted to conventional 'admiralty tort jurisdiction' but is 'status oriented, reaching all injuries sustained by longshoremen in the course of their employment.' Id., at 904. The matter should be at rest after Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U.S. 114, 82 S.Ct. 1196, 8 L.Ed.2d 368. In that suit under this Act we said that "Congress intended the compensation act to have a coverage coextensive with the limits of its authority." Id., at 130, 82 S.Ct., at 1205, quoting from De Bardeleben Coal Corp. v. Henderson, 5 Cir., 142 F.2d 481, 483. Judge Sobeloff in the instant cases, while answering the argument that Calbeck was not concerned with the meaning of 'upon the navigable waters,' referred to Judge Palmieri's opinion in Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v. Arrien, D.C., 233 F.Supp. 496, 500, aff'd, 2 Cir., 344 F.2d 640:

'(W)hat is just as important as the actual holding in Calbeck     is the general approach to the (Longshoremen's Compensation)      Act taken by the Court. No longer is the Act viewed as merely     filling in the interstices around the shore line of the state      acts, but rather as an affirmative exercise of admiralty      jurisdiction.' Judge Sobeloff went on to say:

'This affirmative exercise of the admiralty power of Congress     'to the fullest extent' of its jurisdiction, creating 'a      coverage co-extensive with the limits of its authority,' can      only mean that Congress effectively enacted a law to protect      all who could constitutionally be brought within the ambit of      its maritime authority. Again, in the words of Judge     Palmieri, 'it thus appears that 'upon navigable waters' is to      be equated with 'admiralty jurisdiction.'" 398 F.2d, at 905.

In addition to the cases being reviewed here, the Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment in favor of the widow of a longshoreman (238 F.Supp. 78), who, while working on the pier, was struck by a cable and knocked into the water where he died. It is incongruous to us that in an accident on a pier over navigable waters coverage of the Act depends on where the body falls after the accident has happened. For this and the other reasons stated by Judge Sobeloff, we dissent from a reversal of these judgments.