NSC-68

NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security

(April 14, 1950)

A Report to the President

Pursuant to the President's Directive

of January 31, 1950

TOP SECRET

[Washington,] April 7, 1950

Contents Terms of Reference

Analysis

I. Background of the Present World Crisis

II. The Fundamental Purpose of the United States

III. The Fundamental Design of the Kremlin

IV. The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of Ideas and Values Between the U.S. Purpose and the Kremlin Design  A. Nature of the Conflict B. Objectives C. Means 

V. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities--Actual and Potential

A. Political and Psychological B. Economic C. Military 

VI. U.S. Intentions and Capabilities--Actual and Potential

A. Political and Psychological B. Economic C. Military 

VII. Present Risks 

A. General B. Specific 

VIII. Atomic Armaments  A. Military Evaluation of U.S. and U.S.S.R. Atomic Capabilities B. Stockpiling and Use of Atomic Weapons C. International Control of Atomic Energy  IX. Possible Courses of Action  Introduction The Role of Negotiation A. The First Course--Continuation of Current Policies, with Current and Currently Projected Programs for Carrying Out These Projects B. The Second Course--Isolation C. The Third Course--War D. The Remaining Course of Action--A Rapid Build-up of Political, Economic, and Military Strength in the Free World  Conclusions and Recommendations  Conclusions Recommendations