Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company v. Tisdale

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Iowa.

This action was brought, in December, 1867, by Mrs. Tisdale, upon a policy of insurance, bearing date March 1, 1866, issued to her upon the life of Edgar Tisdale, her husband. Evidence was given tending to show his death on the 24th of September, 1866. This evidence consisted chiefly in his sudden and mysterious disappearance under circumstances making probable his death by violence. It seems from the charge of the court that evidence was given by the defendant tending to show that he had been seen alive some months after the date of his supposed death. To sustain her case, the plaintiff offered in evidence letters of administration upon his estate, issued to her by the County Court of Dubuque County, Iowa. The defendant objected to the admission of this evidence. The objection was overruled, and the letters were read in evidence; to which the defendant excepted.

The court charged the jury that 'the real question is, whether Edgar Tisdale was dead at the time of issuing the letters of administration. It is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that fact. She has shown, as evidence of that fact, letters of administration issued to her as administratrix by the probate judge. It is the duty of the court to instruct you that this makes a prima facie case for the plaintiff, and changes the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant. . . . Without contradictory evidence, these (the letters of administration) give the plaintiff the right to recover.' To the charge in this respect the defendant excepted.

The defendant prayed the court to instruct the jury, that 'in an action brought by the plaintiff in her own right on a contract between herself and the defendant below, and not in a representative capacity, she must establish by competent testimony the death of the insured, independently of the letters of administration;' and that, 'when the issue in a suit brought upon a policy of life insurance is the death of the insured, letters of administration granted upon his estate are not prima facie evidence of his death, where the suit is not brought by his administrator.' But the court refused to give such instructions; to which the defendant excepted. Judgment was rendered against the defendant, who sued out this writ of error.

Mr. Frederick T. Frelinghuysen and Mr. Edwin L. Stanton for the plaintiff in error.

The real question in this case is, whether, in an action brought by a plaintiff in his own right upon a contract between himself and the defendant, in which the issue is, whether a person who has not been absent seven years is dead,-the legal presumption being that he is alive,-letters of administration issued upon his estate by a probate court in an ex parte proceeding are sufficient evidence to countervail that presumption, shift the burden of proof, and, in the absence of contradictory evidence, establish the death. In such an action, it matters not, as respects their admissibility and effect, whether they were granted to the plaintiff or to some third person.

It is believed, that, upon a review of adjudicated cases and of the opinions of text-writers, the rulings of the court below will be found to be opposed to the weight of authority on this question. French v. French, 1 Dick. 268; Lloyd, Executrix, v. Finlayson, 2 Esp. 564; Thompson v. Donaldson, 3 id. 64; Moons v. De Bernales, 1 Russ. 307; Clayton v. Gresham, 10 Ves. 288; Leach v. Leach, 8 Jur. 211; 2 Stark. on Ev. 365; 1 Phil. on Ev. 343; Taml. on Ev. (41 Law Lib.) 154; Hubback on Ev. of Succession to Real and Pers. Prop. (37 Law Lib.) 162.

Upon principle and analogy, as well as authority, it is submitted that letters of administration are not, in the case at bar, admissible as proof of death. The only ground for their admission is, that granting them is a judicial act in the nature of a judgment in rem. But a judgment is not evidence of any matter to be inferred by argument therefrom, or which comes collaterally in question, or is incidentally cognizable. The Duchess of Kingston's Case, 11 St. Tr. 261; 1 Stark. on Ev. 257. The grant of letters to the plaintiff on the personal estate of Edgar Tisdale was the res in the Probate Court. Unless impeached for fraud, the grant is conclusive as to her title in her representative capacity to that estate, and as to her right to execute the trust of administratrix. This was directly and conclusively adjudicated; but the death of Edgar Tisdale is only matter of inference from such grant.

Mr. George Crane for the defendant in error.

Letters of administration are admissible as prima facie evidence of the death of the person upon whose estate they are issued. Tisdale v. Conn. Life Insurance Co., 26 Iowa, 170; Jeffers v. Radcliff, 10 N. H. 242; Newman, Adm. v. Jenkins, 10 Pick. 516; Ketland v. Administrator of Lebering, 2 Wash. U.S.C.t. Ct. 201; Cunningham v. Smith, Adm., 70 Penn. St. 450; Munro v. Merchant, 26 Barb. 383, 397; Belden v. Administrator, &c., 47 N. Y. 308; French v. Frazer, Adm., 7 J. J. Marsh. 431; 1 Greenl. on Ev. (8th ed.) sect. 550 and cases there cited; 2 id. (8th ed.) sects. 278 a, 278 b, 278 c, 278 d, and 355; Tisdale v. Conn. Life Insurance Co., 28 Iowa, 12.

As the whole 'scope and bearing' of the charge on this subject must be taken together (Hollingsworth v. Thompson, 7 Pet. 348), it will be observed that the court below permitted the jury to attach less weight to the letters than is ascribed to them by some of the authorities.

MR. JUSTICE HUNT delivered the opinion of the court.