Muse v. Arlington Hotel Company/Opinion of the Court

Writs of error may be sued out directly from this court to the circuit courts in cases, among others, in which the construction or application of the constitution of the United States is involved, or in which the validity or construction of any treaty made under the authority of the United States is drawn in question. Act March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 826, c. 517, § 5). If this case does not fall within one or both of these classes, this writ of error cannot be maintained.

As ruled in Ansbro v. U.S., 159 U.S. 695, 697, 16 Sup. Ct. 187, 189, 'A case may be said to involve the construction or application of the constitution of the United States when a title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under that instrument; but a definite issue in respect to the possession of the right must be distinctly deducible from the record before the judgment of the court below can be revised on the ground of error in the disposal of such a claim by its decision.' Cornell v. Green, 163 U.S. 75, 78, 16 Sup. Ct. 969, 971.

The same rule is applicable in respect of the validity or construction of a treaty. Some right, title, privilege, or immunity dependent on the treaty must be so set up or claimed as to require the circuit court to pass on the question of validity or construction in disposing of the right asserted. Borgmeyer v. Idler, 159 U.S. 408, 16 Sup. Ct. 34.

The general doctrine has been frequently announced in cases involving the jurisdiction of this court under the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act of September 24, 1789 (section 709 of the Revised Statutes), and acts relating to the revision of judgments of the supreme court and court of appeals of the District of Columbia, and the supreme courts of the territories, as well as in cases involving the jurisdiction of the circuit courts. Railroad Co. v. Hopkins, 130 U.S. 210, 9 Sup. Ct. 503, and cases cited; U.S. v. Lynch, 137 U.S. 280, 11 Sup. Ct. 114; South Carolina v. Seymour, 153 U.S. 353, 14 Sup. Ct. 871; New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U.S. 411, 14 Sup. Ct. 905; Linford v. Ellison, 155 U.S. 503, 15 Sup. Ct. 179; Durham v. Seymour, 161 U.S. 235, 16 Sup. Ct. 452; Hanford v. Davies, 163 U.S. 273, 16 Sup. Ct. 1051; F. G. Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler Co., 166 U.S. 648, 17 Sup. Ct. 709.

The amended complaint stated that plaintiffs would 'rely upon the following written evidences of their title for the maintenance of this action,' and enumerated among them 'the third article of the treaty between the United States of America and the French republic, of April 30, 1803, which was ratified on the 21st of October, 1803,' and 'the fifth amendment to the constitution of the United States'; but nowhere was any right, title, privilege, or immunity asserted to be derived from either constitution or treaty. There was nothing to indicate in what way, if any, the cause of action was claimed to arise from either.

The fifth amendment prohibits the deprivation of property without due process of law, and the taking of private property for public use without compensation. The treaty of cession (Public Treaties, p. 232) provided for the protection of the inhabitants of the territory ceded, in the enjoyment of their property. But neither amendment nor treaty gave what was not already possessed.

The jurisdiction of the circuit court was invoked on the ground of diverse citizenship, and not on the ground that the case arose 'under the constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority.' Act Aug. 13, 1888 (25 Stat. 433, c. 866, § 1). And it is settled that, in order to give the circuit court jurisdiction of a case as so arising, that it does so arise must appear from the plaintiff's own statement of his claim. Mining Co. v. Turck, 150 U.S. 138, 14 Sup. Ct. 35; Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 164 U.S. 105, 17 Sup. Ct. 40.

If this case had been taken to the circuit court of appeals, the decision of that court would have been final, under the sixth section of the statute; and it might well be concluded that, therefore, the writ of error would not lie under the fifth section.

In respect of plaintiffs' case, as stated in their complaint, the circuit court decided no question as to the application or construction of the constitution, or the validity or construction of the treaty.

The ground, among other grounds, in defeat of plaintiffs' action, that the claim was barred by the act of June 11, 1870, was, indeed, sustained, but that was a matter of construction; and the constitutionality of the act, if held to apply to the claim, rather than to the amenability of the United States to suit, was not considered, nor does it appear that the judgment of the circuit court was invoked upon it. In this court it was contended for plaintiffs in error that the act was an enabling act, authorizing suits to be brought against the United States which otherwise could not have been maintained; that the limitation operated on the jurisdiction, and not on the right; and that to bar title if suit were not brought within 90 days was so unreasonable that the intention to do so could not be imputed to congress. These fortible suggestions would undoubtedly have been accorded due weight by the circuit court of appeals, but we are unable to deal with them on this writ.

The circuit court also held that plaintiffs' title failed because of noncompliance with the Spanish law. It was not pretended that the treaty, the validity of which was confessedly not in dispute, could be so construed as to compel judicial recognition of unconsummated claims, and it was for the circuit court to determine into what category the alleged grant fell. In doing so, the construction of the treaty was not drawn in question in any manner. Writ of error dismissed.

Mr. Justice HARLAN and Mr. Justice WHITE dissented.